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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Several theorists in the area of interorganizational analysis 
focused on the distinction between the "vertically-oriented"organ-
ization (where the authority runs downward from the federal or 
state to local level, and where the vast bulk of resources are 
controlled by a parent agency), and the "horizontally-oriented" 
organization (where the authority runs horizontally among a particular 
network of organizations). The intent of their inquiry has been to 
illustrate the problems associated with the vertically-oriented 
organization in terms of service deli very within a particular network 
of organizations. For instance, Burton Gummer, in his study of the 
interorganizational relationships of a public welfare agency, found 
that vertically-oriented organizations would have little involvement 
with other organizations in its functional and geographic environment 
because of its dependence upon a parent body for the supply of 
virtually all of its resources (Gummer, 1974). Because the 
vertically-oriented organization is dependent upon the parent agency 
for its survival, it will be more concerned with internal affairs, and 
thus Ie s sconce rned with inte rorganizational acti vitie s. 
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Sol Levine and Paul White, in their study of community health 
organizations, concluded that local member units of vertically-
orie nted organizations, because they are less dependent upon the 
health system, and can obtain resources outside the system, interact 
less with other local organizations than horizontally-oriented organ-
izations (Levine and White, 1961). This study also pointed out that 
this independence from the rest of the local health system and 
greater dependence upon a system outside the community causes 
specific types of disagreement among the local system. 
Finally, Levine, White, and Paul in their study of 68 volun-
tary health care agencies in four communities, point out that 
vertically-oriented organizations with local chapters or affiliates 
are limited or circumscribed by priorities established by national 
bodies. By contrast, organizations such as the Community Chest and 
the United Fund (both horizontally-oriented organizations) are geared 
to the local community. Given the diverse sources of authority it is 
understandable that maximal inter-agency cooperation is not always 
attained (Levine, White, and Paul, 1963). 
All of these studies have documented a structural explanation 
of the cause of interorganizational coordination. Namely, the organ-
izations' capacity to engage in interorganizational acti vitie s will be a 
function of its location vis-a-vis its major providers of resources. 
Those organizations located in a vertically-oriented, corporate 
structure will tend to interact less with other organizations in a 
particular functional or geographic community causing a serious 
problem of fragmentation in the delivery of services. 
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Given this perspective, the current trend in domestic national 
policy toward decentralization of policy-setting and decision-making 
to local levels of government (the "new federalism") can be expected 
to worsen the already high degree of fragmentaion in service delivery 
systems. The traditional approach to program integration in the 
past has been the guidelines surrounding the granting of federal funds 
to the states and localities. These guidelines have always placed a 
high priority on program coordination and integration as a condition 
for the receipt of funds. The "new federalism," despite its attempt 
to support the devolution of power to state and local governments, 
has also placed a high priority on integration and coordination as a 
condition for the receipt of federal dollars. To the extent that the 
"new federalism" pursues a strategy of "no strings" attched funds, 
then one can expect the kind of internally-oriented behavior that 
characterizes the vertically-oriented organization to persist. 
Thi's study will focus on a particular program (The Area 
Agency on Aging) which was developed in response to the problems 
of fragmentation among the service delivery system for the aging. 
In so doing, two very important questions will be answered: 
1. To what extent does the characteristics of the Area Agency on 
Aging reseITlble a vertically-oriented organization? 2. To what 
extent does the Area Agency on Aging gear its activities toward 
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the coordination of services for the elderly? The basic assumption 
is that because the Area Agency on Aging resembles another 
vertically-oriented organization, its main focus of attention will be 
on internal concerns (i. e., survival) rather than interorganizational 
acti vitie s. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
The model used in this description of vertical and horizontal 
organizations is an open systems perspective which focuses on a 
network of organizations in interaction with its environment. As 
Howard Aldrich (1973) has pointed out, the major difference between 
this approach and more traditional approaches to organizational 
analysis is that, 1) it places a greater concern on factors making for 
internal or intra organizational conflict and variation as opposed to 
an emphasis on internal cooperation and stability, and 2) it empha-
sizes turnover and conflict within a network of organizations rather 
than studying a particular unit-set. 1 This approach illustrates the 
difference between interorganizational analysis and organizational 
analysis in that it starts out with the assumption that conflict is a 
given, and the elimination of this conflict is a deviant instance and 
likely to lead to a disruption of interorganizational relations (Litwak 
1 A network has been defined as If ••• consisting of all the 
groups and organizations as well as the consumers associated with 
a particular production system designed to service some customer 
or client. II (Hage, 1975: p. 212) 
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and Hylton, 1972). It stresses the operation of social behavior under 
conditions of partial conflict and the factors which are equally 
derived from all units of the interaction rather than being differen-
tially weighed by authority structure. 
By stressing the fact that the environment makes conflicting 
demands on the organization, internal variation becomes essential 
if organizations are to respond to environmental changes. Many 
available contributers to a theory of organizational structure do not 
incorporate the direct source of variation in formal structural 
arrangements, i. e., the strategic decision of those who have the 
power of structural initiation. A theoretical incorporation of the 
decision-making process within a particular organization has su~gested 
that, 
..• constraints upon structural choice are 
weakened in their effect to the extent that 
the decision-maker perceive that the design 
of the organization t s structure only has a 
limited effect on performance levels 
achieved. (Child, 1972) 
This is due in part to the contextual constraints facing the organ-
ization. Despite the fact that they perceive structural design to have 
some impact upon performance levels, the dominant coalition (or 
organizational decision-makers) within the organization may be in a 
position to institute modifications to the context in order to maintain 
a preferred structure without harm to the performance level. 
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However, if the organizational decision-makers perceive the structure 
as posing certain performance implications they may prefer to 
"satisfice": to trade-off some potential gain in performance for a 
congenially structured mode of operation (Child, 1972). Con-
sequently, they may have some choice over performance standards. 
In the open- systems model, the exercise of strategic choice 
can be defined as "the determination of basic long-term goals and 
objectives of an enterprise, the adoption of a course of action, and the 
allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals tI , 
(Chandler, 1962: p. 13). It is important to note here that the 
decision-makers prior ideology will color this evaluation to some 
degree. Structure, in turn, can be defined as "the design of the 
organization through which the organization is administered II 
(Chandler, 1962: p. 14). As Alfred Chandler (1962) has shown in his 
study of four major corporations in the United States, "structure 
follows strategy, and that complex types of structure is the result 
of the concatenation of several basic strategies II' (Chandler, 1962: p.14). 
Those aspects of the organization's variability which approximately 
map the environment are se1ecti ve1y reinforced through inte rna1 and 
external mechanisms. In terms of internal mechanisms, strategic 
action will involve an attempt to establish a configuration of man-
power, technology, and structural arrangements which is internally 
consistent and consistent with the size and nature of the operations 
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planned (Child, 1972). Internal mechanisms can either be formalized 
through a planning process or kept informal through boundary 
personnel. Strategic action with regard to external variables may 
include a move into or out of a given market or areas of activity in 
order to secure a favorable demand or response that will be ex-
pressed by a high valuation of the organization's product or services. 
Through the reinforcement of organizational acti vitie s, exte rnal 
mechanisms are performed (Aldrich, 1973). The conjunction of 
efficiency (internal) and demand (external) will in the end determine 
the organization's overall level of performance. 
Organizational C oncep.ts 
Organizations in this study will be treated as goal-directed, 
boundary maintaining, information processing activity systems. 
Within each organization, abstract purposes, charter goals, and the 
like come to be translated into ongoing programs (Benson, 1975). 
Once this process has been reached and advanced, the decision-
makers within their perspective organizations are responsible for 
expanding their established programs. Abstract goals then recede 
into the background of shared assumptions which are taken for 
granted and may be employed for the legitimation of ongoing pro-
grams (Benson, 1975). Other key concepts in this approach include 
the idea of task environment, domain, and organizational sub-systems. 
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Task Environment. James Thompson (1976) has described 
the task environment as "those parts of the environment which are 
relevant or partially relevant to the goal setting, goal attainment, 
survival or effectiveness of the organization If Richard Hall (1972). 
makes a distinction between the general environment (i. e., political 
technological, ecological demographic, and cultural) and the specific 
environment (or task environment) which he describes as being 
composed of the organizations and individuals with which the 
organization is in direct interaction. This raises a question with 
regard to the study of interorganizational relations, i. e., to what 
extent need the theorist demonstrate a clear link between something 
in the organization's en vironment and change in the organization IS 
behavior. The definition of the task environment which this per-
spective takes is defined as " •.. consisting of all parts of the 
environment potentially or actually relevant to the organization's 
behavior fI (Aldrich, 1973: p. 51). This takes into consideration 
the organization's behavior despite its awareness of all parts of 
the environment. 
Domain. The domain of the organization is defined as the sub-
set of the task environment and refers to a range of activities claimed 
by the organization itself. The possession of a domain permits the 
organization to operate within a specific sphere, claiming support 
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for its activities and defining proper practice s within its realm 
(Benson, 1975: p. 232). 
The in-put domain consists of those points at which the organ-
ization is dependent upon inputs from the environment, and can be 
broken down into two dimensions. One is the range of products or 
services needed and the technology to obtain them, and the other is 
what Roland Warren (1973) defines as the in-put constituency which 
consist of, 
... those organizations or actors acknowledged 
by the organization as supporting, financing, 
promoting, providing program material, or 
making decisions regarding the functioning of 
the organization. (Roland Warren, 1973: pp. 
173-174) 
The out-put domain consists of those points at which the organization 
is dependent upon exchanging its products or services for resources 
from the environment. The out-put constituency consists of those 
other organizations acknowledged by the organization as being an 
appropriate target for its activities. Finally, the through-put domain 
consists of the points to where the organization is dependent upon its 
environment for processing its services (Aldrich, 1973). 
Resources. In focusing on relationships between organizations, 
it is important to determine the elements that flow between organiz-
ations and their environment or other organizations. These elements 
will be defined in terms of resources sought after by the organization 
or the units that possess those resources. Following Yuchtman and 
Seashore (1967), it is assumed that organizational decision-makers 
are typically oriented to the acquisition and defense of an adequate 
supply of resources, and that this orientation determines within 
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fairly restrictive limits, the nature of interactions both on the service 
delivery level and in the performance of mandated functions. 
Two types of resources are paramount to this perspective: 
money and authority. Money is of obvious importance to the main-
tenance and the expansion of programs, the recruitITlent of personnel, 
and the purchase of buildings and material. Authority refers to the 
legitimation of activities, the rights and responsibility to carry out 
programs of a certain kind dealing with a broad problem area of 
focus (Benson, 1975: p. 232). 
The assertion that organizations pursue an adequate supply of 
nloney and authority leaves a number of questions unanswered. Many 
different actions lUay be cOITlpatible with this broad and general re-
quirement. J. Kenneth Benson (1975) has addressed this issue by the 
elaboration of operational decision criteria governing interagency 
relations. The following are a list of such decision rules: The first 
is the fulfillment of prograITl requirements. The organization IS 
claim to an adequate supply of resources (ITloney and authority) will 
be based on the adequacy and efficiency of established programs. Thus, 
agencies will be reluctant to undertake tasks or tolerate practices of 
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other organizations that interfere with the fulfillment of present 
programs. Second is the maintenance of a clear domain of high 
social importance. This criteria is based on the as sumption that 
organizations strive for autonomy. Decision-makers are oriented 
to a clear-cut, uncluttered claim. that includes a set of important 
activities. Finally, the third is the extended application and defense 
of an agency's paradigm, i. e., agencies are committed to their own 
definitions of problems. According to Benson, (1975) organizations 
taki ng othe r approac he s constitute an implicit threat to the flow of 
authority and money into an organization. 
CHAPTER III 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXTS 
Many organizational theorists have focused to a considerable 
degree on the impact that certain contextual factors (factors suc h as 
origin and history, dependency, interorganizational relations, etc.) 
have on the structure and performance level of an organization. 
Pugh, et aI, (1969) in their study of several British industrial firms, 
found that certain contextual factors had a direct bearing on the 
structure of an organization. For example, they found that older 
organizations tend to be more decentralized. Furthermore, Blau 
and Schoenherr (1971), in their study of employment agencies through-
out the country, found that the size of an organization had a tremen-
dous amount of correlation with certain structural variables. Both 
of these perspectives, however, are based more on a closed system 
perspective. They do not take into consideration the process of 
strategic choice or internal variation among organizations. The 
following section will describe corporate (vertically oriented) as 
well as federate (horizontally oriented) organizations in te rms of 
how they have responded to and/or adapted to certain contextual 
variables. In so doing, some of the distinguishing features between 
vertical and horizontal-types of organizations will be illustrated. 
ORIGIN AND HISTORY 
In looking at the history of organizations, the major focus 
will not be on origins p~~, but on the consequences for organiz-
ational growth and expansion, such as the capacities of the organiz-
ation to carry out the purposes for which it was established. This 
section, therefore, will focus on the consequences which led to the 
development of three distinct kinds of organizations: large scale 
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business organizations, voluntary organizations, and government 
controlled relief-giving organizations. As will become evident, there 
are many similarities between these organizations with regard to the 
kinds of environmental and technological constraints facing them 
which served to influence the kinds of decisions that were open to 
the organizational decision-maker. What is of particular interest 
to this study, however, are the variations between these organizations 
in terms of how they responded to these constraints. These vari-
ations help to further clarify the difference between the vertically-
oriented and the horizontally-oriented organization with regard to 
their impact on the organizations' level of efficiency and performance. 
Busines s Organizations 
Alfred D. Chandler (1962), in his book Strategy and Structure, 
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mapped out a sort of administrative history of "industrial enterprise" 
(large pri vate, profit oriented firms involved in handling goods in 
some or all of successive industrial processes) using the rationale of 
"strategic choice. 11 The overall thesis of his investigation illustrated 
the fact that changes in organizational structure was related to ways 
that the enterprise expanded, and that re -organization of the organ-
ization were influenced by the state of administrative art in the 
United States, i. e., strategic growth resulted from an awareness of 
opportunities and needs - created by changing populations, income, 
and technology - to employ existing or expanding resources more 
profitably (Chandler, 1962: p. 73). Consequently, by looking at the 
ways that these enterprises expanded it will be possible to under-
stand more fully the origin and history of private, profit-making 
vertically as well as horizontally-oriented organizations. 
Early American Enterprises. Before 1850 very few American 
businesses required a full-time administrator or a clearly defined 
administrative structure. Industrial enterprises were quite small 
and generally were family-run and operated. Those responsible for 
the operation handled all the basic activities - economic, adminis-
trative, operational, entrapaneurial, etc. In the agrarian and 
comn1.ercial economy of ante-bellum America, business adminis-
tration as a distinct activity did not exist. In mining, manufacturing 
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and transportation, the general superintendent was in charge of 
supervision of the labor force while in larger textile manufacturing 
industries, the president or treasurer was in charge of finances and 
arranged for the purchasing of activities (Chandler, 1962). 
Yet before the 1850s a few of the largest economic enter-
prises in the U. S. did develop distinct administrative structure s. 
John Jacobs Astor's American Fur 
Company, Nicholas Biddle's Second Bank 
of the United States, or rather boards of 
director s of pri vate corporations that built 
the major canals and first railroads and the 
state board of public works, all these had 
field units and a headquarters. 
(Chandler, 1962: p. 15) 
For instance, Astor's American Fur Company managed its monopoly 
of the fur trading industry in the vast region west of the Mis sis sippi. 
The department headquarters managed its out-fits each headed by a 
trader Besides this supervision, they did most of the marketing for 
supplies. Although these were some of the largest enterprises of 
their day, the Bank and Fur Company had little impact on the later 
development of administrative organization in the large industrial 
firms in this country - the Fur Company was virtually dissolved when 
Astor withdrew from the partnership. 
This distinct administrative structure was particularly 
significant in the construction of the Erie Canal and other trans-
portation works during the 1820s and 1830s. During the construction, 
the line of the canal was divided into a number of divisions, each in 
charge of an assistant engineer who was responsible for surveying 
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the route and then inspecting the progress of the construction. At the 
headquarters a chief engineer supervised the works of the assistants 
in the field (Chandler, 1962). Thus, there was a clear distinction 
between the administrative component (a major headquarters) and an 
operational component (the field unit). However, the task of the 
organization was more technical than administrative, it was only to 
layout the line and then see that the contractors carried out plans. 
A board provided the funds and made the major decisions as to the 
location. Until the 1850s the contracting firms which actually built 
the transportation works remained small and had little need for 
systematic organizational structure since such a contractor rarely 
built more than one section of a road at a time (Chandler, 1962). 
He could, therefore, supervise the job himself. 
EXp'ansion of Industrial Enterp'rise. With the completion of 
the great east-west trunk lines early in the 1850s, administration 
became a full-time task in American business. The largest enter-
prises in the nation required new methods of management. They 
needed to set up a system where there was a detailed definition of 
the line s of authority and communication between headquarters and 
the many divisions. This required a constant flow of reports and 
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superintendents who would be responsible for coordinating, appraising, 
and planning the work of the ope rating di vi sions. 
As the roads grew in m.ileage, and the volum.e of traffic ex-
panded, the num.ber of their adm.inistrative personnel increased and 
their operating structure had to be re-defined (Chandler, 1962). 
They spelled out the lines of comm.unication and authority between 
the m.aj or and anscilliary units within the transportation departme nt 
and also between the transportation and other m.ajor departm.ents 
such as traffic and accounting. This growth and expansion in the 
railroads helped to enlarge the market for Am.erican m.anufacturing, 
m.ining, and m.arketing firm.s. The railroads perm.itted and often 
required that these enterprises expand and subdi vide their acti vities, 
thus calling for specialization and the encouraged use of m.ore com.-
plex m.achinery. This spurred further increases in out-put and so 
provided another pressure for expansion and continued growth. 
In addition to the expansion of the railroad, other environ-
m.ental factors helped to influence the growth of m.ajor industrial 
enterprises in the United States. Between 1840 and 1880, the urban 
population grew from. 11 % of the total population in the U. S. to 28% , 
or 4% per decade. In 1800, the rural population stood at 36 m.illion 
and the urban population equaled 14.1 m.illion. By 1900, the figures 
were 45 m.illion (rural) and 30.2 m.illion (urban), and by then agri-
cultural incom.e was estim.ated at only 3,034 m.illion out of a total 
national private production income of 14,000 million dollars 
(Chandler, 1962: p. 23). 
In meeting the needs posed by the environmental factors, 
many American factories, mining and marketing firms began to ex-
pand their domains through vertical integration by multiplying the 
volume of out-put and later these enterprises very quickly expanded 
through geographic dispersion - they started to buy or build other 
units distant from their original locations. As James Thompson 
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(1967) has pointed out, in integrating forward an organization acquire s 
distribution capacity greater than its out-put. This requires that the 
organization increase its out-put, which the task environment may not 
be able to handle. A strategy for organizations to take when capacity 
is in excess of what the task environment can support will be to expand 
their domain by increasing the population served. In other words, 
they expand through geographic dispe rsion (Thompson, 1967). The se 
strategies of vertical integration and geographic dispersion had their 
beginnings before the depression of the 1870s. Only afterwards, in 
the 1880s and 1890s did the great impersonal corporate enterprises 
appear in any numbers in American industry. 
The Growth of Corporations. The large multi-function enter-
prise sprang from two quite different strategies of growth and ex-
pansion. In one strategy a single company began to exp,and and 
20 
integrate by creating its own marketing organization. In another, a 
number of manufacturing companies which had joined together in a 
horizontal combination such as a trade association, pool, trust, or 
holding company - consolidated their manufacturing activities and 
then moved quickly forward into marketing or backwards into pur-
chasing (Chandler, 1962). This later type was employed by organiz-
ations producing more staple commodities by an older, less complex 
technology. Both strategies, in turn, were in response to a rapidly 
growing market due to population growth and the expansion of the 
railroad making more accessible certain manufactured goods. The 
more common road to the formation of the vertically integrated in-
dustry was by way of "horizontal combination" (the combination of 
several di verse manufacturing industries) and consolidation 
(Chandler, 1962). 
The threat of excess capacity appears to have been the primary 
reason to the initial combinations in most American industries. The 
reason for this being that the rapid increase in out-put of small 
enterprises exceeded immediate demand. The market was gutted. 
Consequently, these organizations combined in order to control or 
limit competition by setting price and production schedules. 
However, as Chandler (1962) pointed out, these "equal feder-
ations or horizontally-oriented organizations, " in manufacturing in-
dustries were short-lived. Production and price schedules were hard 
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to enforce and they failed to employ fully and effe cti vely the exi sting 
resources of their members. Occasionally a federation dissolved 
into its original parts, more often it consolidated. This was more 
evident in those organizations troubled by concentration of control. 
Administratively, these consolidated structure s provided for 
centralized planning, coordination, appraisal, and planning for its' 
extended plant and personnel. A combination became adminis-
trativelya consolidation only after its executive office began to do 
more than set prices and production schedules. 
The loose alliance of manufacturing firms into a single con-
solidated organization with central headquarters made possible 
economies of scale through standardization in the procurement of 
materials (Chandler, 1962). Moreover, horizontal consolidation and 
centralization immediately created much more pressure for vertical 
integration than did mere combination. Coordination and the inability 
to build up an industry1 s own special market through brand names 
and advertising, and the development of products more nearly 
fitting the needs of the consumer was inhibited by this consolidated 
structure. Consequently, many firms began handling their own pro-
duction and manufacturing. 
A s was previously mentioned, threats and othe r defensi ve 
reaons played a critical role in stimulating consolidation and inte-
gration. The resulting threat of unemployed resources and price-
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cutting, the need to apply resources effectively to changes in short-
te rm. dem.and, and the de sire to as sum.e m.ore satisfactory m.arketing 
facilities or to have a certain supply of stocks, raw m.aterials and 
other supplies led to this strategy for expansion. 
During the 1900s the m.ost dynam.ic and significant organiz-
ations becam.e dom.inated by a few vertically integrated enterprises 
ope rating in national and often world m.arkets. Sm.all firm.s re-
m.ained, but to exist they had to rem.ain specialized or m.eet the 
needs of a local area (Chandler, 1962). When the m.anagers of a 
"federation" or a com.bination of integrated com.panies decided to co-
ordinate, appraise, and plan system.atically their work, they alm.ost 
always consolidated their activities into a single centralized function-
ally departm.entalized organization. This rendered com.pliance with 
specifications as well as providing a com.m.unication network that 
linked all of the facilities involved in the industrial process with the 
custom.ers' dem.ands. 
The fault with this structure, however, was that very few m.en 
were entrusted with a great num.ber of com.plex decisions. As long as 
an enterprise existed in a stable environm.ent, where there were no 
changes in sources of raw m.aterials, m.arkets, and production 
processes, they could rem.ain centralized. Where technology, 
markets, and sources of supply were changing rapidly, the defects 
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of the centralized structure became more obvious 2 (Chandler, 1962). 
During the last two decades the growth of the multi-divisional 
"decentralized" structure came into existence. Diversification was 
most responsible for this decentralized form. It increased the level 
of complexity of both ope rational and entrapaneurial acti vitie s. In 
other words, if expansion re suIted only in the de velopment of a full 
line of goods that continued to use much the same type of resources, 
the reorganization of the marketing department so that it had an 
office for each major type of customer was usually sufficient. On the 
other hand, where business diversified into totally new lines serving 
a variety of people, decentralization emerged. 
Conclusions. From this historical account of organizational 
expansion as it relates to business enterprises in the U. S., it is 
possible to see the environmental and technological influences 
affecting the kinds of decisions or strategies that these organizations 
took in terms of their structural design. These strategies made the 
transition from a single organization to a combination of integrated 
organizations, to a centralized departmentalized consolidated struc-
ture, and finally to a multi-divisional decentralized structure. It is 
2For the past half-century most copper, zinc, tobacco, 
sugar, banana, and liquor companies have made much the same 
product for much the same type of user - they continued to run with 
the same centralized, functionally departme ntalized form. 
(Chandler, 1962: p. 36) 
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also interesting to note the fact that this pattern varies between or-
ganizations. There is no one right way to structure all com.plex 
organizations. Heterogeneity and dynamism. of the environm.ent m.ake 
for the scattering of choice am.ong m.any sub-units, but this depends 
to a certain degree on the organization's awareness of its effect on 
the environm.ent. Chandler (1962) has pointed out that such organiz-
ations as the National Dairy recentralized when their m.arkets becam.e 
m.ore nearly hom.ogeneous due to such factors as urbanization and 
industrialization of the nation. On the other hand, m.any firm.s have 
recently decentralized as electronic data processing has increased; 
this decreases the tim.e required to acquire knowledge about the 
environm.ental fluctuations and plan adjustm.ents. This illustrates 
the fact that not only do organizations adapt to certain environm.ental 
constraints, but in m.any instances they are in a position to institute 
m.odifications to the context to m.aintain a preferred structure. 
It is of particular interest in this study to note the environ-
m.ental and technological factors which influenced the shift from. 
a federation to a centralized structure such as com.petition and the 
need to standardize m.arketing procedures.. This is not to say that 
when an organization is faced with these environm.ental and techno-
logical constraints it will autom.atically change in term.s of its 
structural design. Quite the contrary, strategic growth results 
from. an awareness by the organizational decision-m.aker of 
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opportunities and needs - created by changing populations, income, 
and technology to employ existing or expanding resources more 
profitably. Thus, it was this awareness that influenced the strategy 
to centralize. 
Voluntary Organizations 
This section will describe how the history of voluntary organ-
izations of the social service type have been affected by the evolution 
of American society and the environmental and technological factors 
accompanying this evolution. Voluntary organizations used in this 
description will be defined as "those organizations which have local 
affiliates or chapters throughout the country, have membership com-
posed of volunteers, and depend on contributions as their ITlain source 
of financing" (Sills, 1957: p. 14). As will becoITle evident, changing 
social conditions have produced new probleITls thus creating occasions 
for the eITlergence of new voluntary organizations and influencing old 
ones to change their goals, much like the kinds of changes that the 
business organizations as described above went through. As technical 
expertise developed in American life, as the work in the voluntary 
organizations becoITle ITlore complex, as the leisure class volunteer 
disappeared, the voluntary organization in AITlerica becaITle ITlore 
profe s sionalized and specialized. One way the se organizations adapted 
to environITlental constraints, therefore, was to forITl specialized 
units to face a limited range of contigiencie s within a limited set of 
constraints (Thompson, 1967). 
The Early Volunteers. In the colonial period, the natural 
hazards of living made necessary a code of ethics that placed em-
phasis on industriousness and thrift, and which equated poverty and 
moral weakness with sin. We can trace our attitudes toward the 
rights and responsibilities of individual members in our society to 
these moral judgments which place a premium on independence and 
self-help. 
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It was not until the revolution and the corning of the industrial 
revolution that social welfare institutions were created to correct 
"social evils" (Seider, 1960: p. 5). As mentioned previously, this 
period marked a time of rapid growth in the population, and the 
change in migration patterns. People were moving to the cities in 
response to industrial growth and labor demands. The problems 
associated with these environmental influences awakened moral con-
sciousness and resulted in efforts to reform the individual and 
society. 
The first volunteers belonged to the social class of industrial-
ists and bankers who were influenced, to a certain extent, by 
religion. This group of people truly started the first charitable 
organizations in America, where emphasis was placed on Jlthe wise 
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giving of charity" (Seider, 1960: p. 5). Consequently, these first 
agencies grew out of personal interests of these wealthy individuals, 
and were inspired by local concerns or by growing national move-
ments. Such organizations as the Children's Aid Society (forIned in 
1883 for the purpose of placing vagrant boys and girls with families 
in rural districts), the Young Men's Christian Association (this was 
originally developed for the purpose of placing boys in urban faInilies), 
hOllles for unwed mothers, and such organizations as the B'nai 
B'rith (Sneider, 1966, p. 6). 
During the Civil War, the institutionalization of charity was 
further developed as people were encouraged to support agencies 
rather than giving personal charity. In SOIne progressive states 
public agencies began to emerge. These agencies set up welfare 
boards to stir indifference of church m.embers to the terrible con-
ditions of the poor in institutions. However, public aid was still 
neglected as private agencies began to flourish (Seider, 1960). In 
1882, New York had approximately 194 private agencies giving 
relief (Seider, 1966). These agencies, in turn, operated on an 
uncoordinated basis. This created serious probleIns of duplication 
of services and inter-agency conflict. The Charity Organization 
Society of New York was established as a central registration to 
avoid duplication of services and to encourage inter-agency cooper-
ation. These agencies had yet to com.bine into federations despite 
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this effort to coordinate, appraise, and plan services on a statewide 
basis. 
The 1900s and the EXp'ansion of the Voluntary...Qr.ganization. 
With the great improvement in economic conditions in the early 
1900s, social reformers saw, in abundance, an opportunity to 
alle viate inadequate living conditions through a redistribution of 
wealth. The concern of people from all classes of society turned to 
the effect of low wages, child labor, and poor working conditions. 
Consequently, various private voluntary organizations began to 
flourish such as the YMCA, labor unions, federations of women's 
clubs, etc. (Seider, 1966). Citizen input made for a general under-
standing and involvement. 
As these groups of citizens began to organize, the community 
became bewildered by the complexity of services and annoyed by the 
demands for contributions .. Not only were these agencies providing 
family child welfare, rec reation, informal education, health and 
hospitals, mental health, and prison reform, but they were under the 
auspices of religious, non-sectarian, and public agencies. In order 
to bring order to chaos, the development of social planning emerged 
calling for joint consideration and coordination (Seider, 1966). 
From Pittsburgh's first council of social agencies (1908) and 
Cleveland's federated fund raising body, the concept of coordination 
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and integration of services, joint planning by agencies for new ser-
vices, and federated efforts at fund raising gained impetus (Seider, 
1966). The growth in population and technological complexity com-
bined with the chaos as mentioned above, competition, and inte r-
agency conflict helped to influence these organizations to horizontally 
combine. Moreover, being that the primary responsibility for fund 
raising became more of a cross-section of the community, the control 
of the wealth shifted to more community control. All of this taken 
together, marked a shift to more of a horizontal line of control among 
the se voluntary organizations. 
The Threat of War. In the development of voluntary organiz-
ations the move toward horizontal combination as a way of mobilizing 
community support became particularly apparent during World War 1. 
At this time two national organizations were formed: the American 
Association of Community Funds and Councils of America Inc., and 
the United war activities fund (Seider, 1966). The latter brought to-
gether seven national agencies to establish a joint national budget, 
and to assign quotas to be raised by local war chests. This movement 
helped to expand the number of war chests throughout the country. It 
was also the first time that national board members and business 
leaders engaged in a national planning effort affecting local community 
services on a coordinated basis. Here is an example of a horizontally-
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oriented organization where the authority is delegated upwards and 
where the decision-making rested entirely on the agreem.ent am.ong 
the parties. This can be dem.onstrated by the fact that this organiz-
ation was created by a group or people meeting together and appointing 
officers to act in the name of the organization, a distinguishing 
feature of a horizontally-oriented organization (Sills, 1957). In other 
words, the circumstances under which this organization was created 
most clearly demonstrate s the direction in which the delegation of 
authority took place. 
World War I witnessed another major development in the ex-
pansion of volunteer services under the American National Red Cross, 
organization fir st in 1881. The initial objective of this organization, 
as set forth in its original constitution, was 
... to hold itself in readiness in the event of 
war or any calamity great enough to be considered 
national, to inaugurate such practical measures 
in mitigation of such suffering, and for the pro-
tective of relief of the sick and the wounded as 
may be consistent with the objecti ves of the 
Association. (Sills, 1957: p. 262) 
The American Red Cross started out very sm.all in its early years, 
and flooding and disasters, the Spanish American War, and most 
importantly, World War I provided sufficient resources to make any 
expansion of its objectives unnecessary. The strategy for expansion, 
in turn, during World War I took the form of "vertical integration. " 
It began to contract out professional services to public welfare 
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agencies in more than 3, 000 communities throughout the country 
(Seider, 1966). This is an example of a strategy where a single organ-
ization begins to expand and integrate by creating its own se rvice 
organizations. This type of expansion also illustrates a more 
vertically- oriented type of organization where authority is being 
delegated downward. 
After World War I this organization continued to expand, yet 
this occurred without any objective. Membership in the organization 
also began to decline. As James Thompson (1967) has stated, "multi-
component organizations subject to rationality norms will seek to 
grow until the least reducible component is approximately fully 
occupied." In integrating forward, much like the example of the 
American Red Cross, an organization has acquired distribution 
greater than its capacity. Sometimes the task environment cannot 
handle increased out-put. Thus, "Organizations with capacity in 
excess of what the task environment supports will seek to expand their 
domain" (Thompson, 1967). The American Red Cross expanded its 
domain by the adoption of a new program, "the preservation and im-
provement of Public Health" (Sills, 1957: p. 262). It became in-
volved in giving relief during the beginnings of the depression of the 
"30s. 
The prosperous years between World War I and the depression 
of the thirties was marked by a push toward specialization and 
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professionalization more than the expansion of programs. In the 
traditional family and child agencies, volunteers were being excluded 
from direct contact with the client and were relegated to clerical 
tasks or to service on boards and committees (Seider, 1966). Be-
cause the task environment became more heterogeneous producing 
greater constraints for the organization, these organizations began 
to put boundaries around the scope of adaptation necessary by setting up 
specialized units. This enabled them to face a limited set of contingen-
cies within a limited set of constraints (Thompson, 1967). 
The Consolidation of the Voluntary..Q1:ganization. The dis-
asterous depres sion years of the thirtie s served to consolidate many 
voluntary organizations and to set and raise standards of voluntee r 
work. Standardization as a mechanism for coordination of services 
became even more pronounced. These agencies which were prin-
cipally responsible for clarifying these roles consisted of national 
organizations such as the Association of Junior Leagues of America, 
the National Council of Jewish Women, the Family Welfare Associa-
tion of America, the National League for Public Health Nursing, etc. 
(Seider, 1966). Through these agencies specific opportunities for 
volunteers in the health and welfare field were defined, and principles 
for supervising were worked out. The National Committee on Volun-
teers in social work brought together social workers and volunteers 
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to stimulate and improve volunteer service. This was accomplished 
locally through the organization of the volunteer bureaus, most of 
which formed a part or affiliated with the local council of social 
agencies (Seider, 1966). These bureaus, in turn, are the proto-type 
of the horizontally-oriented organization. They are examples of 
partnerships or coalitions of independent agencies on whose goodwill 
and support they depend (Perlman and Gurin, 1972). 
The advances made in defining the role of the volunteer in 
depression times were tested and even further defined during World 
War II. The creation of the Office of Ci vilian Defense (OCD) influenced 
the disbandment of the independent Committee on Volunteers in social 
work. The job of coordinating became a more centralized task during 
war-ti:me. This organization helped to coordinate the 4, 300 civilian 
defense volunteer officers who had the responsibility for manning the 
protective and community war services. Most services in the social 
welfare field which were called upon to expand services to meet the 
needs of youth, women, the elderly, and handicapped workers pressed 
into wartime employment (Seider, 1966). 
In 1944, the Association of Junior Leagues of America and the 
Community Chests and Councils of America, Inc., sponsored a joint 
study of post-war speculations for local centralized bureaus. The 
central concern behind this study was the awareness of the fact that 
maintenance of citizen contributions during peacetime (a time when 
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there was no moti vation for meeting wartime crisis with patriotic 
service) presented a serious problem. 'This move, in turn, called for 
national leadership which the Advisory Committee on Volunteer Ser-
vice, established by the Community Chest and Councils of America, 
assumed responsibility_ 'This became in 1945 the Advisory Committee 
on Citizen Participation, and which later (in 1951) became an impor-
tant coordinating agency. It coordinated federations of voluntary 
organizations on a national level (Seider, 1966). 
It should be noted, at this point, that the vertically and 
horizontally-oriented organizations refer to patterns which rarely 
exist in pure form, and that not all of these organizations conform 
perfectly to the classification as stated earlier. More specifically, 
none of the federations in the voluntary sector conform perfectly to 
the definition generally found in the literature, i. e., an affiliation of 
previously existing organizations. For example, the National 'Tuber-
culosis Association was founded in 1904 by a group of doctors and 
laymen and "much of the early Association staff was directed toward 
the organization of state tuberculosis associations'· (Sills, 1957:p. 8). 
United Cerebral Palsy, another horizontally-oriented organization 
was founded in 1949 as an affiliation of local organizations, but most 
of the present affiliates were established through the encouragement of 
the national office. Despite the fact that the initiative for the estab-
lishment of the local chapters of these organizations came from the 
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central national office, the proce s s of growth and adaptation has led 
to a situation in which the balance of power lies in the local organiz-
ations. Their legitimation, therefore, comes from a local source. 
For this reason they are best classified as horizontally-oriented 
organizations. 
The Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, formed in 1937 through 
the influence of President Roosevelt, illustrates a vertically-oriented 
type of organization. In creating the foundation, President Roosevelt 
delegated the responsibility for combating polio to others. From 
there, the Board of Trustees delegated the operating responsibilities 
to both a professional staff and to volunteers (Sills, 1957). It is 
important to note that this process of delegating authority involves 
the recognition and legitimation of individual initiatives such as the 
initiative of President Roosevelt as opposed to local or regional 
initiative. This, in turn, tends to alter the intentions of the dele-
gators. As David Sills has pointed out, 
This process of delegation is inherently 
paradoxical in nature •.•• If you want some-
thing done right do it yourself, is the advice 
dictated by folk wisdom, but complexity and 
size of many organizational tasks makes this 
advice gratuitous. (Sills, 1957: p. 9) 
With this in mind, organizations can be seen as being in a constant 
state of transformation - partly in response to certain environmental 
influences, and yet partly in response to the consequences which 
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emerge from the process of delegation. Thus, it can be said that 
organizations formed by an individual or a small group (such as the 
Foundation for Infantile Paralysis) who appoint staff to help them 
carry out the task of the organization, and when its staff, in turn, 
creates conunittees, divisions, and branches, delegation is directed 
downward. As either the vertically-oriented organization (as des-
cribed above) and the horizontally-oriented organization become more 
complex, and as both formal and informal rules are established, the 
patterns of delegation become more complicated. Situations may 
develop in which delegation goes both directions (Sills, 1957). 
However, the funamental basis for this distinction between these 
two type s of organizations is the focus of ultimate authority within the 
organization. In organizations having corporate -type of structure s, 
the national headquarters exercises supervisory powers over the com-
ponent units, while the federations in the affiliate retain a large 
measure of autonomy. This issue will be dealt with and elaborated on 
in the discussion of dependency. 
Conclusions.. Although there is much more to be said with re-
gard to the history and origin of voluntary organizations, this brief 
summary has touched upon considerations involved in the development 
of both the ve rtically- oriented organization and the horizontally-
oriented organization which have also illustrated to a certain extent 
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the distinction between these two types of organizations. Moreover, 
this summary has illustrated some important variables which distin-
guish busines s enterprise s and voluntary organizations. 
As was mentioned previously, philanthropists, and reformers 
produced the first voluntary organizations which were dedicated to 
serving indi viduals. The original mission of most of these early 
organizations was to teach small voluntary societies how to give relief 
so as to avoid 'Ipauperizing" people, while at the same time providing 
them proper, spiritual, friendly help. The basic ideology behind 
these organizations stressed the idea of Hlocalism" and influenced in 
part the development of the horizontally-oriented organization. As 
these organizations began to expand, they added devices so as to avoid 
duplication, such as the development of coordinating and planning 
bodies to evaluate services on a local level. As part of the promotion 
of localism these coordinating bodies also influenced the public in 
terms of contributions to these local services. This latter point 
illustrates the fact that organizational decision-makers will try to 
influence the context so as to maintain a preferred structure. Through 
this influence on the public, they were able to maintain the horizontally-
oriented structure, such as federations. 
Business organizations, on the other hand, consolidated most 
of their federations into one organization or corporation so as to 
avoid competition among these enterprises. Since competition, as 
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opposed to cooperation, is built right into the rubric of business organ-
izations, consolidation was a more likely route to take. 
It is also interesting to note the fact that both business organiz-
ations and voluntary organizations are similar in how they went about 
developing ways in which they protected themselves against the organ-
izational forces which have created them. Some of the devices were 
planned, some were adopted because they are generally accepted 
principles of adnrinistration, and still others were established more 
or less accidentally as a response to some operational problem which 
was not perceived by the decision-makers as being related to the 
broader problem of delegation. These control mechanisms do in fact 
serve to prevent goals of the organization from being unduly modified 
despite the fact that the organizational decision-maker mayor may 
not be aware of the usefulness of these features. 
As horizontally-oriented organizations developed from both 
internal forces (the delegation of authority) and external forces (the 
push toward localism), vertically-oriented organizations also 
developed from internal processes of delegation as well as external 
forces calling for a unified effort to solve or concede to a particular 
problem or "demand." This later point will becom.e even more 
evident in the discussion on the development of government relief-
giving organizations. 
Gove rnment Relief -Gi ving~anizations 
As Francis Piven and Richard Cloward (1971) have pOinted out, 
liThe modernization of any society generally entails expansion of the 
power and authority of the national government." They have demon-
strated through their historical analysis of relief-giving organizations 
in capitalist societies that during disruption in the economy it is 
usually local government that moderates the tremors by extending 
relief. The major decision-makers on a local level have the final say 
over relief arrangements. They are responsible for the necessary 
incremental adjustments. 
As mentioned previously, organizations do not adapt easily, 
not only because of internal rigidities, but also because change re-
quires that the fiscal support provided to institutions must be changed. 
For example, if local relief rolls rise, the local taxpayer becomes 
embittered by the rise of state taxes. Accordingly, the ability for 
local government to respond is inhibited while the expansion of the 
local relief systems strains and overloads the fiscal, administrative, 
and political underpinnings of the relief system. When the local 
system begins to break down, the government then responds. 
Pi ven and Cloward also point out that, 
The governn1.ent will also intervene on local 
relief operations when the expansion of local 
relief begins to intrude on the operations of the 
labor market. (Piven and Cloward, 1971: p. 39) 
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The government's usual response is to force "contraction" of relief. 
The federal government in the United States intervened to assume a 
massi ve expansion of relief during the great depression (and again in 
the 1960s), but more to contract relief arrangements, thus illustrating 
how an organization can institute modifications to the context in order 
to maintain a preferred structure, such as the maintenance of localized 
relief - gi ving organizations. 
The following section will be concerned with a more detailed 
description of the history and origin or government controlled relief-
giving organizations. From this discussion certain common elements 
will become apparent among government controlled organizations with 
voluntary as well as business enterprises in terms of the influences 
on the development of administration in the United States. Where 
government controlled relief-giving organizations have diverged from 
these other organizations relates to the ways that they have instituted 
modifications to the context so as to maintain a preferred structure. 
The Early DeveloRment of Relief-Giving. Relief developed 
slowly in the United States. Except in the South, agriculture was 
conducted mainly by independent farmers on their own land; there 
was no large rural proletariate as in England (Pi ven and Cloward, 
1971). Consequently, everyone looked out for their own. When in-
dustrialization did set in, it grew rapidly more or less absorbing the 
41 
growing population. The open frontier land se rved, until the late 
ninetee nth century, to drain off the deprived and the disc ontented. 
Thus, as Piven and Cloward have stated, " ..• there were no serious 
outbreaks of disorder so as to provoke relief concessions" (Piven and 
Cloward, 1971: p. 45). 
The factors as stated above also helped to nurture the Ame rican 
belief in economic individualism, liThe unshaken conviction held by the 
poor and the affluent alike that rags could be converted to riches" 
(Piven and Cloward, 1971: p. 46). On the one hand, this belief served 
to influence the large multi-departmental business organization. On 
the other hand, it served to limit or dampen the expansion of govern-
ment controlled relief - gi ving organizations. 
The doctrine of self-help through work, which distinguished 
nineteenth century capitalism, flourished in the U. S. Poverty in the 
U. S. came to be regarded as lithe obvious consequence of sloth and 
sinfulness ... the promise of America was not affluence, but independ-
ence, not ease but a chance to work for oneself to be self-supporting, 
and to win esteem through hard and honest labor II (Piven and Cloward, 
1971: p. 47). The very notion of a relief system seemed blasphemous. 
As a consequence, what services that were in the way of relief were 
fragmented and scattered. Each township cared for its hungry in 
different ways, such as the giving of food, incarceration in alms-
houses or indentured services (Piven and Cloward, 1971). 
42 
With urbanization and industrialization, various problem.s and 
diverse patterns of relief began to m.ultiply. As was m.entioned pre-
viously, m.ost if not all of these patterns of relief had their source in 
voluntary organizations. Gradually a shift toward the institution of the 
alm.shouse or workhouse occurred. The first alm.shouse opened in 
Boston in 1740. By 1884 there were 600 in New England. Eventually 
states passed laws distinguishing alm.shouses as the prim.ary m.ethod 
of caring for the poor. However, it rem.ained for the local com.m.unity 
to finance and operate them. (Piven and Cloward, 1971). 
The idea that poor relief, if it was gi ven at all, was a local 
rather than a state or federal responsibility despite the hardships of 
im.m.igration, m.igration, and cyclical depressions. Federal aid was 
periodically sought and given in cases of disasters such as floods and 
droughts, but not for the disaster of unem.ploym.ent. 
Early on in the twentieth century, the states began to establish 
pensions for the blind, the aged and widows. For the m.ost part, the se 
program.s were not m.andatory; im.plem.entation rem.ained a local and 
usually a county prerogative (Piven and Cloward, 1971). 
The Great Dep'ression. When the Great Depression struck in 
the 1930s,almshouses, indentured services, and private charities 
remained the soul resource for the destitute. President Hoover 
limited himself to offering rhetorical encouragement to local charity 
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efforts. In addition several resolutions introduced in Congress to 
aid victims of drought were defeated as was a measure to appropriate 
$25 million for the Red Cross and unemployment relief (Pi ven and 
Cloward, 1971). 
In 1931, with over 8 million people unemployed, the Emergency 
Committee for Employment was replaced by the President's Organiz-
ation on Economic Relief. However, this organization mainly served 
to publicize the need for charity, to reaffirm the virtues of local 
responsibility, and to call for "coordination of local efforts" (Piven 
and Cloward, 1971: p. 51). In other words, they served to focus 
their attention away from mass destitution and toward the adminis-
trative confusion among the various local charities. Such agencies 
as the State Welfare Boards were developed which served not to give 
direct relief, but to coordinate local voluntary organizations. 
Moreover, President Hoover's remedies for the difficult 
employment situation included such programs as block aid, where 
each block in the community cared for its own. This was in the 
early years of the depression. Another plan during Hoover's term in 
office was to share work by cutting work hours. However, workers 
were reluctant to share their meager earnings - in the 1930 payments 
in wages declined by 300 million dollars from the first quarter of 
1929 to the first quarter of 1932 (Smith and Zeitz, 1970: p. 81). 
This economic decline was much more serious than anyone had 
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assumed, yet the fears of a further business collapse led to the 
creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which provided 
loans to banks, life insurance companies, railroads, and other 
organizations. It permitted that loans be made to voluntary organiz-
ations' states for relief and to potential purchasers of farm com-
modities. In addition to these strategies to stimulate the economy, 
Hoover also instituted the Horne Loan Bank to enable homeowners to 
keep their property so as to promote new buildings (Smith and 
Zeitz, 1970). None of these ITleasures had any iITlpact on the econoITlY 
which was characterized by overproduction and underconsumption. 
The burden of public and private agencie s became too great 
as unemploYITlent spread and more and more people began to descend 
on relief agencies with pleas for aid. The Community Chest felt 
compelled to carry a large share of the load. They insisted in their 
public reports, even during the worse part of the depre s sion, that 
they rather than governITlent agencies were the appropriate vehicle 
to handle relief probleITls (Pi ven and Cloward, 1971). Most of the 
relief load was carried by local tax revenues. Reports from several 
ITlaj or citie s s howe d that relief expenditure s by local ci tie s had in-
creased froITl $22, 338, 114 in the first three ITlonths of 1929 to 
$73,751,300 during the period of 1931 (Piven and Cloward, 1971). 
Municipalities had to strain to ITleet these escalating relief costs. 
Ad hoc scheITles were developed in these localities to try and deal 
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with this strain, such as taxing municipal employees the equivalent of 
a day's salary each month. As a result , tax revenues fell off sharply 
as municipalities tried to float bonds to pay for relief. Many 
localities had been brought to the verge of bankrupcy. The concept 
that the delegation of authority moves upward , and that relief is a 
local re sponsibility became ineffecti ve as the environment became 
more heterogeneous and dynamic, creating too many constraints for 
a horizontally-oriented organization to adapt to. 
Without work a way of life began to collapse, 
... many began to define their hardships not 
as an individual fate, but as a collective 
disaster, not as a mark of individual failure, 
but as a fault of the system. 
(Pi ven and Cloward, 1971: p. 61) 
A s the legitimacy of economic arrangements weakened, anger and 
protest escalated. The depression thus gave rise to the largest 
movement of the unemployed in the history of this country. 
On March 21, 1933 the destitute and the unemployed got re-
lief. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt called for a Civilian Con-
servation Corp, a public works program, and federal emergency 
relief. All of these strategies to centralize government programs 
provided jobs for the millions unemployed. The Public Works 
Administration was then established in June of 1933 which served to 
provide jobs for the needy and for fuel to the economy (Smith and 
Zeitz, 1970). 
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As the government became more aware that local relief and 
voluntary organizations could not handle the problems of relief, 
Congress approved the Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933 which 
appropriated $500 million to provide relief to an estimated 18 million 
people. Under the direction of Harry Hopkins, administrators and 
social workers were brought in to handle problems of managing such 
a large centralized operation. It was then decided that under the 
supervision of the FERA money would be gi ven to state s with the 
requirement that public agencies would administer funds given either 
on a matching basis to states or as direct grants in those instances 
where the governor proved that no funds were available. The policies 
thus established by the FERA were a significant break from the past 
and represented a changed philosophy about the responsibility of 
government for helping needy citizens (Smith and Zeitz, 1970). This 
strategy also represents the basis for the development of the "verti-
cally oriented" organization among-relief giving age ncies at the 
government level (where the authority is delegated from the federal 
to local le vels. ) 
The passage of the Social Security Act of 1935 was the high 
point of social legislation during the New Deal. The program of 
public welfare, like other programs under the Social Security Act, 
had undergone a series of amendments to perfect the program, 
broaden coverage, and liberalize benefits. In addition, other social 
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welfare programs which were assigned to a date prior to the Social 
Security Act were included in the 1935 legislation (Smith and Zeitz, 
1970). Some were administered by the Social Security Board, others 
carne under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor, the U. S. 
Public Health Service and other federal and state administrative 
agencies. New responsibilities and additional money were provided 
to agencies administering programs under the Vocational Rehabili-
tation Act of 1920. The Children's Bureau, a part of the Department 
of Labor until 1946, initiated programs for crippled children and 
provided grants to states for promoting material and child health. 
All of the se programs operated as federal- state c ooperati ve venture s, 
only the insurance program for the aged was designed as a strictly 
federal operation which was administered by district offices irre-
spec ti ve of state boundarie s. 
Many have found it quite difficult to economically assess the 
New Deal. Such programs as the National Industrial Recovery Act 
undoubtedly contributed to business recovery. Regulatory legislation 
helped to restore confidence in banks and business recovery. Labor 
reform led to more humanitarian working conditions in factorie s. 
However, until World War II assure,d recovery by an expansion of 
government into the private sector, investments, income, employ-
ment, and profits never returned to World War II levels. 
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World War II. The road of social change from Franklin D. 
Roosevelt t s third inauguration in 1940 until the election of John F. 
Kennedy in 1960 was filled with indirection. Concern with winning 
World War II, negative reactions to the New Deal, fear of internal 
subversion and ineffective leadership made improvement of or inno-
vation within social welfare institutions difficult. The nation rejected 
a program of national planning to prevent unemployment in 1946. But 
in 1949, when unemployment claims increased by nearly one million 
because of a recession, a housing program aimed at creating jobs 
recei ved congressional approval. Direct relief was therefore con-
verted to work relief. Piven and Cloward have pointed out that, 
lIAs political stability was restored, relief practices in each locale 
are re - shaped day by day to meet manpower needs " (Pi ven and 
Cloward, 1971: p. 39). Thus, in the 50s a time of political stability, 
work relief was cut back and the unemployed were thrown upon state 
and local agencies once again. 
The Turbulent 60 s. The census bureau in 1970 reported that 
between 1959 and 1969 the number Ii ving in poverty in metropolitan 
areas increased from 44% to 51o/c; there was a 420/c drop in the num-
ber of white families below the poverty level while the decline for 
black fanrilies was 27% (Smith and Zeitz, 1970: p. 176). During the 
60s the problems associated with this poverty consumed much of the 
energy of individuals concerned with social reform. 
Politics during the decade were marked by an increasing 
sense of importance of technology in rational decision-making. 
Assassination of important political and moral leaders contributed 
to a sense of alienation among the population. Liberalism was 
accused of, 
•.. maintaining economic growth through 
arms spending, of containing revolution through 
a series of limited police activities, and of 
buying off political discontents by building 
super highways and cars. (Smith and Zeitz, 
1 9 70: p. 1 96 ) 
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All of these factors contributed to political instability and turbulence 
which in turn had a dramatic impact on government-controlled relief-
gi ving organizations. 
On the federal level, the government r s focus in the mid 1960s 
was on welfare rights. When the federal government intervened in 
local relief arrangements it did so not by directly liberalizing the 
existing welfare system, but indirectly through a series of new 
measures which had the consequence of mobilizing pressure against 
local relief arrangements. What emerged was a series of service 
programs for the lIinner cityll - the best known was the War on 
Poverty (Piven and Cloward, 1976). 
In 1961, ten million dollars was initially appropriated under 
the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act for grants 
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to youth developtnent projects for the prevention of juvenile delin-
quency. (Piven and Cloward, 1971) In 1963, the Cotntnunity Mental 
Health Act authorized the expenditure of 150 tnillion dollars to pro-
mote community centers in the cores of cities. A nutnber of further 
programs evolved under the Johnson Administration. In 1964, Title II 
of the Econotnic Opportunity Act appropriated 350 tnillion dollars to 
cotntnunity action progratns. In 1966, Title I of the Detnonstration 
Cities and Metropolitan Developtnent Act called for a cotnpre hensi ve 
attack on the problems in urban areas such as slutns, blight, un-
etnploytnent, and coordination of federal, state, and local public 
pri vate efforts. 
Although each of these tneasures were later tnodified in re-
sponse to feedback frotn Congress and various constituent groups 
such as AMA, each was launched as a distinct White House effort, 
and "each were thrust upon a Congress and a public that were at the 
outset virtu(,l.lly indifferent to the specifics of the legislation" (Piven 
and Cloward, 1971: p. 260). 
There were tnany cotntnonalties atnong all of the various pro-
gratns launched by the federal governtnent during the 1969s. Each 
prog ram singled out the inner city as its tnain target. Each 
channeled sotne portion of its funds to new organizations in the 
inner city, circutnventing tnunicipal agencies which had traditionally 
controlled services. Most important, each made service agencies 
the target of reform. As Piven and Cloward have pointed out, 
The hallmark of the Great Society pro-
grams was the direct relationship between 
national government and the ghettos, a 
relationship in which both state and local 
government were undercut. (Piven and 
Cloward, 1971: p. 261) 
A large portion of funds were di verted to a host of intermediaries 
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other than local government including private agencies, universities, 
and new ghetto agencies. In addition, the federal government imposed 
specific guidelines for the use of these monies that were in fact 
funneled through these municipal agencies. 
Strategy to Eliminate Poverty. At this point it is important to 
note the strategies that the United States has used in varying combin-
ations to prevent poverty. One economist specializing in the study of 
income maintenance discerns four such strategies: make the system 
work, adapt the system to the needs of the poor, adapt the poor to the 
system, and relieve the distress of the poor (Advisory Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations, 1966: p. 16). 
1. Make the System Work. As was evident in the discussion of 
business as well as voluntary organizations, the government 
has played an important role in determining the structure and 
ope ration of the private economy. Functioning as acti ve pro-
moters of big business, they have influenced land-use patterns, 
transport and communication systems, and the advance of 
52 
science. They have also intervened to smooth out swings in 
the business cycle, for example, the move toward regulation 
of business during the depression. 
2. Ada'Rt the System to the Needs of the Poor. Expanding suffrage 
and developing common citizenship have been common ways of 
adapting the system to the needs of the poor. Examples of the 
latter are criminal law and the laws of property and of torts 
and contracts, mechanics lien, and usery laws, industrial 
safety codes and anti-discrimination laws. Regulating the 
labor market by permitting and allowing collective bargaining 
on such matters as child labor, minimum wages and maximum 
hour s have a close bearing on the needs of the poor. Social 
insurance and progressive taxation are other adaptations of the 
system to the needs of the poor. 
3. Adapt the Poor to the System. Attempts to rehabilitate the 
poor have aimed at changing the attitudes, values, moti vations, 
life-styles, and developing their potential productivity. In 
many instances the efforts of schools, churches, charitable 
organizations, and labor unions were designed to transplant 
middle class values and Protestant ethics to the poor in such 
terms that morality and personal salvation were equated with 
mate rial succe s s. 
The use of broad community services is another 
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eITlphasis in adapting the poor to the systeITl. These services 
involved schools, libraries, hospitals, clinics, public housing, 
and sanitary iITlproveITlents. SOITle public services have not 
only been "offered" but cOITlpelled as in the case of school 
attendance. 
4. Relieve the Distress of the Poor. Usually considered the 
residual approach, sOITletiITles this is regarded as cOITlplemen-
tary or an alternative to the other three. However, with the 
distinction between public assistance and social insurance 
becoITling less clear, the fourth strategy is considered by 
SOITle as the "weapon of the future" in the poverty war. 
Of the four ITlajor strategies in dealing with the probleITls of 
pove rty, only the last two - adapting the poor to the systeITl and re-
lieving the distress of the poor - had their eITlphasis on the poor as a 
special group. Developing the econoITlY and such ITleasures as the 
extension of suffrage and collective bargaining were designed ITlore to 
benefit the entire society than the iITlpoverished as a target group. 
As ITlentioned before, the 60s and the 30s ITlarked a tiITle 
where the eITlphasis on national governITlent involvement in the pro-
graITls to eliITlinate poverty reached its peak. The contract COITl-
pliance ITlachinery and the legal powers of the federal governITlent to 
provide equal employment opportunities for disadvantaged ITlinority 
groups was significantly strengthened in the 60s. The Area 
RedevelopITlent Act of 1961 and the Manpower DevelopITlent and 
Training Act of 1962 were aiITled at revitalizing econoITlically dis-
tressed cOITlITlunities and providing ITlore vocational training for 
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the under skilled. The Vocational Education Act of 1963 eITlphasized 
training for the disadvantaged, especially youth. Finally, in 1964 
the EconoITlic Opportunity Act provided funds and strategy for a co-
ordinated and direct attack on the probleITls of poverty. 
In 1964, the ITlajor issues that eITlerged in Congress concerned: 
1) IITlposing the anti-poverty prograITl on existing agencies, 2) the 
issue of separation of church and state involved in the grant pro-
graITls, 3) the issue of states rights which involved the philosophy of 
federalism and the question of Negro rights, and 4) the question of 
whether the prograITl was really needed in the light of the healthy 
econoITlic situation (Advisory C oITlITlission on IntergovernITlental 
Relations, 1966). Consequently, aITlendITlents were ITlade to the 
final act which departed froITl the general practice of federal grant-in-
aid prograITls by allowing cOITlITlunities the alternative of adzninistering 
the comITlunity action prograITl through a private non-profit agency. 
The Johnson Years: Creative FederalisITl. During the Johnson 
AdITlinistration over 240 grant prograITls were enacted and assistance 
dollars were more than doubled. With the exception of Medicare, all 
of the enactITlents during this tiITle relied heavily on intergovernITlental 
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ways of im.plem.enting program. objectives (Walker, 1974). Johnsonian 
emphasis on traditional aid program.s provoked an array of govern-
m.ental, quasi-governm.ental, and even private sector recipients of 
grant funds. Accom.panying this was a near tripling of the direct and 
indirect flow of assistance funds to urban areas that by-passed states 
to local governm.ents. As of early 1964 som.e 70 programs perm.itted 
direct disbursem.ent to local governm.ents (Walter, 1974). 
The general thrust of the federal governm.ent can be seen as 
a m.ove toward "Creative Federalism.." To a certain extent, "Cre-
ative Federalism." is a variation of cooperative federalism. which 
stresses partnership, the sharing of responsibilities and revenues, 
and finally, activism. at all levels. The Creative Federalists during 
the Johnson years ostensibly placed heavy em.phasis on rational goals 
while relying on categorical grants as a m.eans of im.plem.entation. 
They had an expansive view of the system. which included private 
sector participants. They also focused on goals rather than juris-
dictions and placed em.phasis on urban and city problem.s as m.uch as 
rural and state concerns. By the close of the Creative Federalist 
years, nine out of every ten central cities in the largest m.etropolitan 
areas were receiving m.ore federal aid on a per capita basis than 
their suburban counterparts (Walker, 1974). 
The Move Toward Coordination. As the proliferation of 
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government sponsored programs occurred, the need for coordination 
began to be felt by planners and administrators within the federal gov-
ernment. The government responded by moving to create an elabor-
ate structure of coordination both in Washington and at the community 
Ie vel. They relied on a system of mutual adj ustment rather than 
central direction upon what could be attained through negotiation 
among equals - rather than the exercise of central authority (Sunquist 
and Davis, 1969). James Thompson (1967) has pointed out that the 
autonomy of a group facilitates coordination by mutual adjustment, 
but that it is important to recognize that the autonomy is modified: 
A fully autonomous unit would not be or remain a part of the organiz-
ation. Thompson (196 7) described this state as being "conditionally 
autonomous." Under Creative Federalism, therefore, the unit or sub-
set may have more decision-making power, yet it is still a part of a 
larger organization - a point which many Creative Federalists over-
looked. 
At the federal level, the gove rnment de signated coordinator s, 
each with responsibility for a particular field, but without power to 
enforce coordination. Recognizing that cabinet members cannot 
exert power over one another, the statutes governing their authorities 
proceeded in two ways: First of all, they authorized the coordinator 
to assist or advise the President in the exercise of presidential co-
ordinating power. Secondly, they established mechanisms for lateral 
coordination and negotiations of agreeITlents. 
The first of the coordinators - the director of the office of 
Economic Opportunities (OEO) - was established by law in the 
Executive Office of the president in order that he ITlight partake of 
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the presidential coordinating authority. The President initially 
announced that the director would be the pre sidential chief - of - staff for 
the War on Poverty. However, there is no evidence that the President 
used hiITl in the chief-of-staff capacity. OEO becaITle absorbed in-
stead in organizing and operating the Job Corps and setting up 
COITlITlunity Action agencies. It becaITle, in effect, one ITlore vertically-
oriented operating agency of the governITlent. Consequently, on the 
ITlatters of coordination, the directors of OEO negotiated with cabinet 
ITleITlbers as their equals, not as their superior (Sundquist and Davis, 
1969). 
An exaITlination of the directi ve s for the director of OEO, the 
Secretary of HUD, the Secretary of HEW, the Secretary of Labor, and 
the Secretary of COITlITlerce shows an unavoidable overlapping of 
coordinating spheres. One coordinator is responsible, for exaITlple, 
of prograITls affecting urban areas, another for ITlanpower prograITls, 
and still another is responsible for coordinating anti-poverty pro-
graITls. The question can be raised: Is a prograITl for the training of 
poor people in an urban ghetto a ITlanpower prograITl, an anti-poverty 
prog raITl, or a prograITl affecting urban areas? Obviously it is all 
three, yet which coordinator is in charge? These kinds of juris-
dictional disputes, however, were left to be settled by negotiation 
and voluntary acceptance of agreeITlents aITlong cabinet office rs 
(Sundquist and Davis, 1969). 
The proliferation of the vast expansion of federal public 
assistance programs in the 1960s soon overwheln1.ed the local coor-
dinating institutions that were in existence. In the absence of an 
organizational philosophy, no one solution was devised for the pro-
58 
ble ITl of c oITlITlunity Ie vel c oordina tion. By 1967, more than a doze n 
types of federally initiated local coordinating structures could be 
counted. These differed not just in structures and functions, but also 
in the e1em.ents of the cOITlITlunitiesr social and political structures upon 
which they were based. The cry for coordination that was rising 
froITl governors, mayors, and other participants in the federal systeITl 
was directed less toward the need for coordinating federal prograITls 
as such than the need for bringing order to the maze of coordinating 
structures that the federal governITlent was independently propogating 
(Sunquist and Davis, 1969). 
The situation as outlined above regarding coordination as a 
strategy for urban problems is a continuation of a developing process 
with two previous stages. To reiterate what has been stated earlier, 
the first stage began with charity organizations and councils of social 
services and still later the health and welfare councils. Federal 
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level intervention marked the second stage, the most comprehensive 
of which was the Model Cities Program. The third stage began 
during the Nixon administration. It includes the main outlines of the 
first earlier two, but adds an elaboration of technology and also the 
proliferation of federally sponsored structures providing local frame-
works for comprehensive planning under 314b and 701 planning funds, 
HUD's Annual Arrangement system, the Local Executi ve Review and 
Comment Pro~ram, and others as well (Warren (b), 1973). 
Although these programs are all complex, they are all based 
on a simple rationale: 
Programs to address the social problems 
of the city typically fall short of expectations 
because they are fragmented, wasteful, lack an 
overall plan or strategy, and in some cases are 
mutually contradictory. Planning must, there-
fore, be rational in relating means to ends, and 
in reducing contradictory goals, must be definite, 
and must involve all pertinent organizations in 
c ollaborati ve planning and implementing pr 0-
cedures. (Warren (b), 1973: p. 356) 
The Model Cities Project prOvides an excellent example of all 
these ingredients in the coordination process. It offered the cities 
federal monies, called supplemental funds, if they could develop con-
centrated coordinated programs addressed to a broad spectrum of 
slum area problems with some form of participation by residents as 
being an essential ingredient. 
As the programs began to develop two very important things 
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happened. One was the election of a new administration (the Nixon 
Administration) which did not influence the development of the Model 
Cities Program and did not want it to continue. The other related to 
the fact that the re suIts of the program showed little impact on the 
conditions of slum living. For the se two reasons the emphasis of the 
program was changed - the program was justified not for having 
bettered slum conditions, but for strengthening the cities ability for 
comprehensi ve planning and coordination. 
ment: 
Roland Warren sums up this strategy by the following state-
Rather than look for alternati ve strategie s, 
the conclusion is to invest more in the coordinative 
process. At present as indicated, the increased 
investment takes the form of elaborations of 
planning technology - the "hardware approach" -
and a proliferation of federal rubric for local co-
ordination. This occurs de spite the formidable 
weaknesses of the coordination strategy which 
has been pointed out from many sources in recent 
years. (Warren (b), 1973: p. 357) 
The New Federalism. The Nixon-Ford Administrations 
marked a push toward the ItNew Federalism" which, as mentioned 
above, stressed local authority, the coordination of services, citizen 
participation, and greater discretion of state and local governments. 
The difference, however, between the Nixon-Ford strategy and that 
of the Kennedy-J ohnson administrations was the strong support of 
decentralization of federal programs, the enactment of special 
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revenue-sharing prograITls, a curbing of categorical grants-in-aid, 
a strengthening of general governITlents and politically accountable 
state and local officials, a strengthening of the service deli very sys-
teITl, and generally SOITle sorting out of responsibilities for certain 
functions by governITlental levels. Put another way, the New Feder-
alisITl is basically a public shift in ITlanageITlent froITl one style to 
another designed to bring public ITlanageITlent closer to the partici-
patory systeITl. As defined by Rensis Likert, the participati ve systeITl 
provide s for full and free discussion between ITlanageITlent and involve-
ITlent; c oITlITlunication is up, down, and sideways; decisions are ITlade 
throughout the systeITl; there is little or no re sistance to ITlanageITle nt; 
and control is widely shared (Wetle and Rice, 1974). 
One of the ITlajor criticisITls of the strategy proposed by the 
New FederalisITl is that it has not always adhered to its publicized 
principles. Decentralization of prograITl authority to the field is only 
now beginning to effect big ITloney grants. The effecti ve organization 
of the Federal Regional Councils for ITlajor liaison efforts with the 
states and localities still face ITlany hurdles. AITlong these hurdles 
is included the continuing weakness of their ChairITlan's positions and 
the variations in delegated discretion aITlong the various field-units. 
In other words, the lines of cOITlITlunication throughout the system 
have not been clearly drawn which is a necessary aspect for the 
effective functioning of a decentralized systeITl. The adITlinistration 
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of the Partnership for Health and Safe Streets programs, the first two 
block grants programs, has been so ineffective that the latter now has 
a major categorical string attached to it, and the former is attached 
to several strings plus a major HEW effort to revamp it totally. 
Moreover, while general governments are supposed to be favored 
under New Federalism, federally encouraged single-purpose sub-state 
regional bodies have grown during the past six years to more than 
1,800 (Walker, 1974). 
Finally, the New Federalists realized that in order to de-
centralize, they first had to centralize. This led to an erosion of 
departmental and cabinet discretion and decision-making abilities 
while it strengthened the centralizing powers of the White House staff. 
(Walker, 1974) In short, practice has not always matched New 
Federalism precepts. 
Summary. From this historical description of government 
controlled relief-giving organizations, a few general problem state-
ments can be made which are relevant to what has been previously 
stated and to the perspective of this study: 
1. A long series of wars and economic disasters such as the 
depression of the 30s threatening our public system has led to 
the centralization of management at the federal level. Un-
fortunately, this has resulted in a deterioration of the 
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management capability of the continuing decentralized systems, 
namely states and cities. 
2. Our management system below the state level expanded 
rapidly with population increases to include 36, 000 units of 
local government, the results of which can be viewed as too 
great a public decentralization for the effective delivery of 
most public services. 
3. Vertical ties have strengthened over the last four decades, 
but the corporate system has not gone through adequate 
corre sponding change to meet these public problems. 
4. Our administrati ve and legislati ve branc he s ha ve initiated a 
series of federal business management program changes 
during the last twenty years, the Area Agency on Aging (AAA) 
being one suc h program. Their stated purpose has been to 
decentralize the federal government or to "return power to 
the pe ople. 11 
5. The New Federalism design, initiated by President Nixon 
seerrlS to lack a clear understanding and support from Con-
gress and the balance of the vertical structure (states, cities, 
stock holder s, and service recei ve r s). 
6. During the rrlanagernent centralization period of our recent 
history, state and city governments failed to develop their 
internal organizations to respond to changing service needs 
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and problems. As each state and city became less able to 
provide an acceptable level of public service, the federal 
centralization process was reinforced. This has led to a high 
level of system frustration by public consumers, city mayors, 
state governors, and legislative bodies. From the citizen per-
spective, the most severe impact was felt by the low-income 
minority and disadvantaged groups such as the elderly, all of 
whom are least able to gain the attention of a centralized 
system. The intuitive turn has been toward citizen partici-
pation. However, this change came about without a corres-
ponding change in worker acceptance, understanding, partici-
pation, and support for the need for such changes. 
Conclusions. This section describing the origin of the ex-
pansion and developm.ent of business, voluntary, and government-
controlled relief-gi ving organizations has served to illustrate som.e of 
the environm.ental factors affecting these organizations as well as the 
strategies which these organizations chose so as to deal with their 
environm.ent. Although this study deals specifically with government-
controlled organizations (Area Agencies on Aging), the description 
of business as well as voluntary organizations help to draw a clearer 
picture of the factors influencing the "vertically-oriented" organiz-
ation. The following two sections will deal with organizational context 
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in terms of dependency and interorganizational relations, both have a 
direct bearing on the description of the vertically-oriented organiz-
ation. 
Dependency 
Based on a conception advanced by Richard Emerson, an 
organization is dependent on some aspect of its task environment, 
1) in proportion to the organization I s need for resources which that 
element can provide, and 2) in inverse proportion to the ability of 
these elements to provide the same resources. (Emerson, 1962) 
For instance, a branch of a welfare department which is totally de-
pendent upon its parent organization for its resources, is dependent 
upon the state department of welfare to the extent that the branch 
needs financial resources and those resources are not available from 
other sources. 
Dependence can also be seen as the obverse of power. Peter 
Blau (1964) has argued that actors or organizations involved in social 
exc hange who are unable to reciprocate fully end up using compliance 
to the senior's wishes. According to this assumption "power is a 
generalized currency used to equilibrate exchange imbalances" 
(Jacobs, 1974: p. 48). For example, the branch of the welfare de-
partment, who may need resources from the parent organization but 
who is unable to give anything in return, ends up giving compliance .to 
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the parent organization's wishe s. 
Blau, in turn, made an important contribution to Emerson's 
work. He pointed out the existence of coersion as a means to influ-
ence. Power and control then can be thought of in terms of vulner-
ability as well as dependence. The following Table sums up strategies 
of both the dependent and dominant parties in an unbalanced exchange 
relationship. 
TABLE I 
A SUMMARY OF EXCHANGE AND POWER 
Alternatives for Com-
pliance for the Depen-
dent 
1. Supply powerholder 
other inducements 
2. Obtain scarce re-
wards elsewhere 
3. Take scarce goods 
by force 
4. Do without 
Blau, 1964: p. 124 
Conditions of 
Independence 
Availability of 
strategic resources 
Alternative sources 
of supply for scarce 
rewards 
Coercive force 
Ideals defining 
scarce rewards as 
unnecessary 
Strategie s of the 
Dominant 
Remain indiffe rent 
to what dependent 
offers 
Maintain naonopoly 
ove r what dependent 
needs 
Maintain law and 
order 
Sustain value s whic h 
define particular 
scarce rewards as 
necessities 
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This approach to dependence and power has several advantages 
to the study of organizations. It leads to the consideration of relation-
ships between the organization and the several elements of its plural-
istic task environment. Thus, an organization may be relatively 
powerful in relation to those who supply its inputs and relati vely 
powerless in relation to those who receive its outputs or visa-versa. 
On the other hand, an organization may be powerful in terms of both 
its outputs and inputs. 
Those organizations who are relati vely powe rle ss on all 
sectors of its task environment usually end up catering to whatever 
fleeting intere sts of an unstable population it could acti vate at a 
particular time (Thompson, 1967). 
Finally, the power-dependence concept as indicated by this 
approach provides an important deviation from Emerson's concept 
of power which assumes that the power of one organization is at the 
expense of another. By taking into consideration the concept of 
interdependence, we admit to the pos sibility that two organizations 
may become increasingly powerful with regard to each other. It is 
this possibility upon which coalitions rest. 
Viewing dependence in this context, also calls into question 
the closed system models of organizations since, as mentioned 
previously, the open-system.s m.odel explicitly includes organization-
environment relations in the assessment of the effectiveness of a 
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gi ven structure. Since the conditions promoting organizational de-
pendence and independence vary over time and organizational contexts, 
it is likely that under different organizational conditions different 
forms of structure will facilitate the bargaining position of the organ-
ization. By critiquing the work of the A ston Group study conducted by 
Pugh, Hickson, and their associates (1969) this point will become 
more apparent. 
In this study, 52 organizations in Birmingham, England were 
studied. Fourty- six of the 52 organizations were randomly sampled 
and were used in the analytic phase of their study. Dependence, one 
of the weaker points in this study, was conceptualized as either 
relationships with the parent organization and/or relations with other 
organizations. The former was considered the most important. It 
was operationalized by 1) the relati ve size of the focal organization in 
relation to the parent organization; 2) the status of the focal organiz-
ation in its group, that is whether it was an independent organization, 
a subsidy with legal identity, a head branch, or a branch; 3) the 
repre sentation of the focal organization in the policy-making bodie s 
of the parent organization; and 4) the number of specializations con-
tracted outside the focal organization, both from the parent organiz-
ation and from other organizations. 
Dependence on other organizations was operationalized using 
five scales: 1) Integration with suppliers in terms of ownership and 
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contractual ties, 2) response to the focal organization to customer 
influence, 3) integration with customers in terms of ownership and 
contractual ties, 4) percentage of the focal organizations output 
volume consumed by its largest customer, and 5) percentage of the 
largest customer's needs supplied by the focal organization. 
The operationalization of dependence also included: 1) The 
origin of the organization - was it founded by indi viduals or by another 
organization? And 2) the public accountability of the parent organiz-
ation - whether it was quoted in the stock exchange or whether it was 
a government department, the latter being more publicly accountable. 
Briefly summing up the results, the study found that those 
organizations who scored highest on dependence were publicly 
accountable, such as government departments founded by another 
organization with a large number of specializations contracted out, 
vertically integrated, small in size relati ve to the parent organization, 
low in status, and not represented at the policy level. They also 
found that dependent organizations have a more centralized authority 
structure and tend to standardize procedures for advancement and 
selection. They conclude, in turn, that, 
. .. dependence of an organization reflects 
its relations with other organizations in its 
social environment, such as suppliers, cus-
tomers, competitors, labor unions, manage-
ment organizations, and political and social 
organizations. (Pugh, et al, 1969: p. 104) 
70 
While it may be that more dependent organizations demonstrate 
these characteristics, Pugh and his associates did not carry through 
their distinction between dependency on parent organizations'depend-
encies on other organizations. This is a very important distinction 
due in part to the different resources sought from these two sources. 
From the parent organization, the focal organization needs financial 
resources and usually seeks autonomy in decision-making so that its 
administrators can make decisions on their own. From other organ-
izations, especially suppliers, customers and competitors, the 
organization needs raw materials, a market for its products or 
service s, and a large enough share of the market to survi ve (Mindlin 
and Aldrich, 1975). This distinction needs to be made in any analysis 
of dependence. However, in computing dependence scores for each 
organization as well as analyzing the relation of dependence to other 
structural barriers, the Aston group made no further reference to 
the two forms of dependence and ceased to make the distinction in 
their writing. 
DeRendence and Inward Orientation. Following along the 
assumption that organizational decision-makers are typically oriented 
to an adequate supply of resources, and that this orientation becomes, 
for organizational decision-makers, an operational definition of the 
purpose s of the organization and thus of their re sponsibilitie s as 
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decision-makers, then we can assume that because vertically-oriented 
organizations are dependent upon the parent organization for virtually 
all of its resources, they will be independent of other organizations in 
their functional and geographic community. In other words, because 
of this dependency on a single organization outside of the community, 
the vertically-oriented organization expends a great deal of its energy 
complying to the parent body. Consequently, most of its concerns 
will be focused inwardly rather than on interorganizational activities. 
Burton Gummer, in his study of a welfare agency (an organiz-
ation whic h was dependent upon a parent organization for the vast 
supply of its resources) analyzed the responses of the personnel in 
the department to a questionnaire which asked what they thought their 
unique competence was in their jobs. Content analysis produced the 
following four categories: 
1. The services provided by the respondent's unit, such as family 
counseling, housing, horne management, etc.; 
2. the worker's skill in helping people; 
3. knowledge of public welfare procedures; and 
4. knowledge of community resources. 
Nearly one - half of the 27 line workers listed either service of the unit, 
worker I s skill or knowledge of agency procedure s as their unique 
competence, while only three listed knowledge of comm.unity re-
sources. The remaining nine listed a wide range of activities as their 
unique competence. This suggests that the model orientation of the 
line workers is toward activities performed in the organization 
(Gummer, 1975). 
Even m.ore significant was his findings with regard to the 
agency's hierarchy. At the supervisory level only two of the fi ve 
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unit supervisors specifically mentioned knowledge of community 
resources as a unique competence, and only one of the five developed 
guidelines for interorganizational activities in the unit. At the level 
of the executive and deputy executive positions, the orientation was 
entirely toward agency operations. This evidence combined with the 
findings of Levine and White's study (1961) and that of Levine, White, 
and Paul (1969) point to the conclusion that vertically-oriented organ-
izations are more dependent upon a resource base outside the com-
munity, and less dependent upon those organizations in a functional 
and geographic community. 
As mentioned above, all organizations must have external 
support to exist, and to get this support organizations must be 
perceived as functional by those whose support they depend on, i. e. , 
they must be accountable to those organizations who are the pro -
viders of resources. Survival, however, is not the only concern 
of the organization. Another concern is the organization's effective-
ness. In this model, activities are evaluated in term.s of whether 
they further a particular goal. What is common about the survival 
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model and the effecti vene s s model is that acti vitie s and goals are 
the primary means by which organizations establish themselves in 
the environment. They are critical to both their existence and role 
definition. To the extent to which the organization must demonstrate 
that their acti vitie s are functional for the ends of those who are 
supporting them, the two models converge. Given this perspective, 
part of the inward orientation characterized by the vertically-oriented 
organization is subsumed with the legitimization of its stated goals. 
According to John Tropman, organizations that expend much effort 
on the legitimation of goals, Her se, exhibit a lack of a concrete 
planning or action output - they may become dominated by mainten-
ance needs. This is particularly apparent among vertically-oriented 
organizations and causes to a certain extent serious problems in 
terms of service delivery (Rothman, 1974: p. 140). 
Control of DeRendence. As noted earlier, the task environ-
ment is defined by the dependence of the organization. Since depend-
ence introduces constraints and contingencies, the problem for the 
organization is to avoid becoming subservient to elements of the task 
environment. James Thompson has propositioned that: "When support 
capacity is concentrated in one or a few elements of the task environ-
ment, organizations under norms of rationality seek power relative to 
those whom they depend on " (Thompson, 1967: p. 34). What is 
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expected from this proposition. therefore. is that organizations sub-
ject to rationality norms and constrained by monopolized capacity 
t ch as I
On the case of the vertically-oriented organiz-
for suppor , su 
ation, will strategize toward achieving power to offset their depend-
ence. 
The question then is how to achieve power when the environ-
ment does not offer many alternative sources support. 
When organizations establish domains, they acquire depend-
ence. However, as stated above, the acquisition of dependence is 
not so easy. In the managelTIent of the attem.pt to gain power with 
respect to SOlTIe elelTIent in the task environlTIent, organizations 
em.ploy cooperative strategies (Thom.pson and McEwen, 1958). To 
accomplish this, the organization must be able to demonsrate its 
capacity to reduce uncertainty for that elelTIent, and lTIust make a 
commitlTIent to exchange that capacity. 
Thus, an agreem.ent between A and B, specifying that A will 
supply and B will purchase reduces uncertainty for both. A has 
more knowledge about its output targets and B about its inputs. 
Likewise, the affiliation of a pri vate non-profit drug program. with 
a county mental health clinic reduces uncertainty for both. The drug 
program will have increased assurance that it has the resources to 
operate, and the mental health clinic will have the assurance that it 
is satisfying a m.andate to provide services to drug-dependent 
individuals. Consequently, the mental health clinic is able to 
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-t source 01 dependency, that being 
establish power with respect to 1 s 
the state ITlental health division. 
By using cooperative strategies the effective achieveITlent rests 
on the exchange of cOITlITlitITlents for the reduction of uncertainties for 
both partie s. But cOITlITlitITlents are obtained by gi ving cOITlITlitITlents. 
These commitITlents are a two-way street, and ITlanageITlent of inter-
dependencies confront the organization with dileITlITlas. The use of 
contracting, coopting, and coalescing presents a set of alternatives 
to the organization, and represent different degrees of cooperation 
and comITlitment. 
Contracting refers here to the negotiation of an agreeITlent 
for the exchange of perforITlances in the future. This usage is not 
restricted to those agreeITlents which legal bodies would recognize. 
It includes the kind of agreements between the drug prograITl and the 
county ITlental health clinic as illustrated above. It also covers the 
understanding between a university and a donor involving, for example, 
the naITling of buildings. Contractual agreeITlents thus ITlay rest on 
the faith and the belief that the other will perform in order to main-
tain a reputation or prestige. In the case of the vertically-oriented 
organization this is one way in which they can reduce their depend-
e ncy on the parent organization. 
Recently, the federal government has gotten wise, so to 
speak, to this strategy and has placed a mandate on certain 
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contractual agreeITlents with other 
coordinating bodies to forITl these 
organizations · 
This is designed, in effect, to reduce the organiz-
ation's dependence upon the parent organization and thus facilitate 
the deli very of services. 
However, fitting into the proposition that 
organizations that expend ITluch effort on legitiITlation of goals, p'er~, 
such as gaining public approval for existence exhibit a lack of con-
crete planning or action output, then one would expect that this ITlan-
date would be ineffective in accomplishing its stated purpose. In 
other words, with this ITlandate, one would expect the organization to 
expend too much energy legitimizing itself through contractual 
arrangements rather than acting. Consequently, a contradiction is 
placed on the organization with this stipulation as a condition for the 
receipt of funds. 
Burton Gummer (1975) illustrated the low level of activity in 
this area for the branc h public welfare agency de spite the importance 
attached to contractual arrangements for the delivery of service in 
the official guidelines. 
Coopting has been defined as, liThe process of absorbing new 
elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an 
organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or exis-
tence II (Thompson, 1967: p. 35). Cooptation increases the certainty 
of future support by the organization coopted. The acceptance of the 
corporation's board of directors of representatives of financial 
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institutions, for example, increases the likelihood of acce ss to 
The 
financial resources for the duration of the cooptive arrangement. 
drawback to this alternative to reducing dependency is that it places 
an element of the environment in a position to raise questions and per-
haps exert influence on other aspects of the organization. For vertic-
ally-oriented organizations, this is a risky move to take in terms of 
its own survival. 
Coalescing refers to a combination or a joint activity with 
another organization or organizations in the environment. To the 
extent that the coalition is operative, the organizations involved act 
as one with respect to certain operational goals. "Coalitions not only 
provide a basis for exchange, but also require commitments for 
future decision-making II (Thompson, 1967: p. 35). This strategy to 
decrease dependency is a more constraining form than coopting, and 
is therefore an unfeasible strategy for a vertically-oriented organiz-
This point, in turn, will be stressed in the next section 
discus sing interorganizational variables such as frequency of inter-
ation. 
action and joint decision-making. 
A final criticism of the use f o cooperative strategies centers 
on the fact that many programs intended to proVlo de enhanced co-
operation between agencies faol b 1 ecause cooperation is sought without 
attending to underlying power relations (Benson, 1975). A good ex-
am.ple of such a situation is the Cooperative Area Manpower Planning 
---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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System which is designed to produce coordination among manpower 
programs. 'This program failed because it relied upon voluntary 
cooperation of participant organizations and provided for no change 
in the underlying political-economic forces which had previously kept 
the agencies apart. Much of this has to do with the structure of the 
coordinating agency .Yi2.. a vis its major provider of resources. 
ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS: FREQUENCY OF INTERACTION 
This section will be concerned with interorganizational re-
lations in terms of frequency of interaction. 3 An attempt will be 
made to describe, in more detail, some of the theoretical basis for 
much of the research in this area. From this description several 
implications can be drawn with regard to the vertically-oriented or-
ganizations and their relationship with organizations in a particular 
network. 
Exc hange Theory 
Levine and White (1961) have stated that the interdependence 
of the parts of the exchange system is contingent upon three related 
factors: 1) The a ·b·l" f ccessl 1 Ity 0 each organization to necessary 
3 Frequency of interaction has been defined as "Th 
contact, between organizations to be measured in rela;ion t: ::ount of 
lzahon s total contacts with others. 11 (Aldrich, 1973: p. 64) organ-
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t . d a particular system, 
2) the objec ti ve s of the or-
resources ()u Sl e 
to which it allocates the resources 
ganization and particular functions 
- h" h domain consensus exists among 
1 and 3) the degree to w 1C it contro s, 
They go on to illustrate how each of the se 
the various organizations. 
three factors affect the 
exchange of elements among organizations. 
. th various parts (or 
A s illustrated in the previous sectlon, e 
system can be differentiated from each other in 
organizations) of a 
d upon other parts of the system. terms of their relative depen ence 
ce rta1" n parts are relatively depende nt, not having To reite rate, 
th system which is characterized by the access to elements outside e 
horizontally-oriented organization, whereas others, which have 
access to elernents outside the system, possess a high degree of 
independence or IIfunctional autonomy. lJ (Gouldner, 1960). 
In their study of health organizations, Levine and White (1961) 
found that those organizations who are relatively autonomous from 
the rest of the organizations in a particular system, and thus possess 
a high degree of independence, tend to interact less with other local 
agencies than those who are dependent upon the system for their 
needed resources. An examination of the four vertically-oriented 
organizations, in their study, reveals that three of them give re-
sources to other programs to carry out their acti vities and the fourth 
conducts broad educational programs. They point out that such 
functions tend to involve less relationships with other organizations 
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than those that provide direct services. 
They also point out, that the vertically-oriented organization 
may at times produce specific disagreenlents with other agencies 
in the system. This is dem.onstrated by the criticisms fronl the local 
health system toward a community branc h of an· official state re habili-
tation program. The rehabilitation progranl in order to justify its 
existence to the legislature had to show that a certain nUnlber of 
persons had been successfully rehabilitated. In other words, the 
services by this program had to successfully return to self-supporting 
roles a certain number of its debilitated clients. In order to accom-
plish this the rehabilitation program has to accept a select group of 
people causing a great deal of frustration among the local system. 
The frustration relates to the fact that other agencies are unable to 
get the state to accept their debilitated clients for rehabilitation. In 
the eyes of these other agencies the state rehab·l·t t. . 
, 1 1 a Ion agency IS 
remiss in fulfilling its goals. B 
ecause the state agency has to sur-
vive' it is more concerned with its relationsh1·p to the 
legislators who 
control the "pur se string s" than to the re st 
of the system. Given the 
definition of the organ· t· I 
1za Ion s goals, and the state agency's relati ve 
independence of the local health 
system., its interaction with other 
organizations is relatively low. 
Levine, White, and Paul (1963), 
in their study of 68 vOluntary 
health care age . . 
nCles In four connnunities . pOInt out Som.e of the 
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problems facing the delivery of health services due to the multiple 
sources of authority. On the one hand, there are agencies like the 
National Foundation, American Heart Association, and the American 
Cancer Society where the authority is delegated downward from the 
national or state organization to the local chapter. These organiz-
ations are referred to in this perspective as having vertical orien-
tations or corporate structures. On the other hand, there are or-
ganizations with horizontally-oriented structure s such as the Visiting 
Nurses Association and the Family Services which delegate authority 
to the state and national levels. These horizontally-oriented organ-
izations in this perspecti ve are more geared toward the needs of the 
local community. 
Given such diverse sources of authority, then it is understand-
able why maximal inter-agency cooperation is not always attained. 
As a result, of these divergent sources of authority, and for many 
other reas ons as well, organizations in the health and welfare system 
have varying goals which often times conflict. Agencie s differ in the 
standards they employ to evaluate success and the means they use to 
achieve their objectives. 
They point out, in turn, that the importance of conflicting 
goals, especially those from outside the system, are particularly 
evident when it comes to fund raising. For example, vertically-
oriented organizations such as the American Cancer Society resist 
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pleas of horizontally-oriented fund raising advocates and carry out 
their own fund raising campaign. Moreover, these vertically-oriented 
organizations are frequently under attack by agency personnel and 
board members for not spending a greater amount of their collected 
funds for local services. They illustrate the fact that much of this 
clamor and controversy relates to the varying goals and objectives of 
the se agencie s. Ve rtically- oriented organizations requiring greater 
centralization of resources on the federal level are understandably 
alert to activities on the local level which may impede the flow of 
sufficient funds to the national body. In othe r words, the se organi z-
ations in their fund raising dri ve view the health picture from a 
national vantage point. While the local chapters are oriented partly 
to their respective community, the authority of these local affiliates 
is limited by the priorities established by national headquarters. By 
contrast, organizations such as the Community Chest and the United 
Funds (both horizontally-oriented organizations) are geared more to-
ward the local community Rer~. Given the fact that these two 
organizations have different goals and objectives, it is understandable 
why they have difficulty interacting with one another. 
Organizational InterdeEendencies 
Both of these studies point out a very real problem facing the. 
vertically-oriented organizations in term.s of a low level of inter-
action with other organizations in a given com.m.unity, yet their 
definition of interdependency is extremely narrow. As Aiken and 
Hage (1968) have pointed out, studies of organizational interdepend-
encies such as these essentially conceive of the organization as an 
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entity that needs inputs and provides outputs, linking together a 
number of organizations by mechanisms of exchange or transactions. 
Linkages between organizations, however, are conceived of in a 
variety of ways; passage of information, transfers of clients or funds 
or the input-output exchange as mentioned above, and sharing of 
facilities. Looking at these forms of linkages as a continuum of 
interdependence, then passage of information would have relati vely 
low interdependence, while the sharing of facilities or joint activities 
would have relatively high interdependence. What is implied is that 
joint programming, as a definition for interdependence, makes an 
implicit tec hnological as sumption that the production proce s s re-
quires joint efforts that transcend organizational boundaries thus 
,involving a lessening of organizational autonomy. Because organiz-
ations like to maintain their autonomy, there is a natural tendency for 
organizations to avoid creating interdependencies except in relatively 
safe areas that are auxilliary to the main objecti ve s. Jerald Hage 
(1975) gives the example of Welfare organizations who will join into 
joint activities which have relatively little to do with their objectives, 
for instance, such activities as education and research. 
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At this point it is important to distinguish the joint program 
from the jOint organization. The latter refers to a situation in which 
two or more organizations create a separate organization for some 
common purpose. For example, the Community Chest was created 
by the health welfare agencies for fund raising purposes. Business 
organizations have created joint organizations so as to provide service 
functions. These example s clearly illustrate the difference between 
a joint program and a joint organization, the latter having separate 
corporate identities and quite often their own staff, budgets, and 
objectives. Some examples of joint programs would be the student 
exchange program among Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and Cornell 
Universities. Among business organizations, Ford and Mobile have 
begun a joint research project designed to develop superior gasoline. 
Burton Gummer (1975), in his study of the interorganizational 
relationships of a public welfare agency, operationalized his dependent 
variable (contacts with other organizations) by foc using on the exte nt 
to which these contacts are indicative of a sharing of resources be-
tween organizations with a consequent heightening or organizational 
interdependence. The underlying continuum used in this context is 
the degree to which the sharing of resources involves a lessening of 
organizational autonomy, particularly in the area of internal decision-
making processes. Consequently, at one end of the continuum he 
focused on exchanges that involve little or no infringements on 
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organizational autonomy suc h as the sharing of information about 
one r S own service or the gaining of information regarding another 
organization's acti vities. At the other end of the continuum are ex-
changes that involve a major inroad into the internal decision-making 
process such as joint programs. This variable, therefore, was 
termed "purpose of contact" and was measured at an ordinal level: 
Information (low interdependence), Service (moderate interdepend-
ence), and Joint Activity (high interdependence). 
By information, the respondents were asked whether their 
contacts with other organizations involved telephone contacts, in-
formal meetings, and/or letters for the sale purpose of obtaining 
information. By service, respondents were asked about referrals 
to other agencies, follow-up, contacts after referrals, acting as an 
intermediary to facilitate obtaining service s for a client, and in.-
formal meetings about a client as a primary source of contacts with 
other agencies. Finally, respondents were asked whether these con-
tacts involved formal case management in which joint decision-
making occurred, the development of joint services such as a 
common intake, and contractual arrangements to purchase services 
4 
from other organizations. 
4Note: Aiken and Hage argue that the purchase of services does 
not fit into the category of joint activity because it does not affect the 
internal decision-making structure of an organization. However, 
Gummer points out that the experience of the social welfare field, 
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The overall conclusion that Gummer reached after analyzing 
his data is that, while the public welfare agency personnel engaged in 
extensive contacts with other agencies, the intensity of these contacts 
in terms of the number of contacts with anyone agency was not that 
great. Over three -fourths of the contacts fell into the low contact 
rate category, meaning that the vast majority of the agencies con-
tacted were made by a few workers and on an infrequent basis. 
Furthermore, the data reveals that the overwhelming bulk of contacts 
were for the purpose of obtaining service for clients. This study, in 
turn, illustrated the fact that the ve rtically- oriented organization will 
be less likely to be involved in interaction which involve a high degree 
of interdependence (joint activities). 
John Clark and Richard Hall (1974), in their research in-
volving organizations concerned with problem youth, also shed some 
light on the area of interorganizational relations, especially in the 
area of frequency of interactions" which provide some strong im-
plications to Gummer's work. The design of their study involved 
asking these organizations about the nature of interorganizational 
relations. These detailed questions were an attempt to quantify the 
particularly the relationship of the federal government to state and 
local governments via the grant-in-aid programs, suggests otherwise. 
The purchaser of service is in a position to exert some influence on 
the internal decision-making structure of the provider organization 
by imposing requirements on how the service should be provided, who 
should receive them .. and under what conditions. 
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quality of the relationships with each organization. Each respondent 
was asked to indicate the frequency and importance of their organiz-
ation's contacts in this particular network. 
The results of the study showed that: 1) Conflict between 
organizations is positi vely related to good communication as is fre-
quency of interactions; 2) coordination efforts are rather strongly 
associated with such factors as availability of personnel, the import-
ance of contacts, compatible operating philosophies, the assessment 
of good performance on the part of the other agencies, and the assess-
ment that the other organizations have competent personnel; and 
3) coordination is also positively related with good communication, 
suggesting that communications can playa dual role in leading to 
coordination and being part of conflict situations . Generally, this 
study pointed out that frequency of interaction, in terms of the 
intensity of contacts made to other organizations in a network, is 
positi vely related to coordination, communication, and conflict. In 
this case, frequency of interaction does seem to lead to better and 
more coordinated efforts, at the same time it leads to conflict. Gi ven 
the results which Gummer found in his study, then one could conclude 
that the vertically-oriented organization such as the welfare branch, 
would be less likely to be involved in coordinated efforts with other 
organizations in a network, that is, efforts such as joint programs. 
Aiken and Hage (1968) in their study of sixteen human service 
organizations, exaITline the issues involved in the following propo-
sition: "Organizations having ITlany joint prograITls with other or-
ganizations te nd to be ITlore c oITlplex, ITlore innovati ve, have ITlore 
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internal cOITlITlunication channels, and have slightly ITlore decentralized 
decision-ITlaking channels." (RothITlan, 1974: p. 116) Their iITlplicit 
assuITlption is that cOITlplexity (naITlely a high degree of professional-
ization and diversity of occupations) leads to intensified cOITlITluni-
cation between different occupations, which consequently enriches the 
organizational package of ideas, prograITls, etc. Because the 
vertically-oriented organization is less likely to be involved in joint 
prograITls then one would expect these organizations to be less 
innovative, have a ITlore centralized decision-ITlaking structure, have 
less internal cOITlITlunication, and tend to be ITlore forITlalized. 
Howard Aldrich (1973) in his theoretical ITlodel propositioned 
that the concentration of resources in a given network of organizations' 
attracts those organizations which seek to exploit the re source s by 
entering into ITlore frequent interaction with the organization holding 
those resources. By looking at resources in terITlS of ITloney and 
authority (legitiITlation), it is possible to see the dispersion of re-
sources in a given network of organizations where SOITle are vertically-
oriented organizations. Following along Aldrich's proposition, it is 
possible to see why the vertically-oriented organization does not enter 
into frequent interactions with other organizations, i. e., they are not 
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attracted to exploit the resources in a given community. Aldrich 
went on to show that a high frequency of interaction leads to the de-
velopment of formalized relations (on an interorganizational level) as 
organizational learning take s place and each organization gives recog-
nition to the transaction. 5 Fortnalized relations, according to 
Aldrich's theory, lead to a stabilizing effect on the environment, i. e., 
the degree of turnover in the elements of the task environment. If 
one follows along with what has been presented then this proposition 
has several itnplications for the vertically-oriented organization, that 
is, they will be less likely to give formal recognition to transactions 
made to other organizations in a given network, thus presenting in-
stability to the e nvironm.ent. 
PROPOSITIONS CONCERNING THE VERTICALLY-ORIENTED 
ORGANIZATION 
Based on what has been stated throughout this theoretical 
description, the following are a set of propositions which try to sum 
up the characteristics of the vertically-oriented organization: 
5Note : Aldrich defines formalization as: 1) The extent to 
which the transaction between two organizations or groups is gi ven 
official recognition, for example, if agreements are legislati vely 
mandated or at the other end of the continuum, if they are ad hoc 
or informal; and 2) the extent to which an interm.ediary coordinates 
the relationship. 
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Proposition 1. Where there are organizations formed by an individual 
or a small group (ve rtically- oriented organizations) 
who appoint staff, and when staff creates committees 
divisions, and branches, the delegation of authority 
is directed downward. 
Proposition 2. Where authority runs downward from the federal or 
state to local level (such as in the vertically-oriented 
organization) the ultimate control of re source sand 
the decision-making within the organization rests with 
national headquarters, i. e., it is "conditionally 
autonomous. II 
Proposition 3. Because the vertically- oriented organization is de-
pendent upon a parent body for virtually all of its 
resources and is unable to reciprocate fully, it ends 
up using compliance to the senior's wishes. 
Proposition 4. Because the vertically-oriented organization is con-
strained by a central authority, they will be less 
likely to control dependency through cooperation 
strategies such as cooptation and coalition formation. 
Proposition 5. Because the vertically- oriented organization expends 
much effort on the legitimation of goals they lack a 
concrete planning or action output - they become 
dominated by maintenance needs. 
Proposition 6. Because the vertically-oriented organization becomes 
dominated by internal concerns, they are less likely 
to become involved in intense interactions (i. e., joint 
activities) with other organizations in their functional 
and geographical community. 
Proposition 7. Finally, vertically-oriented organizations, because 
they are less likely to become involved in joint 
prograITls will less likely becoITle involved in coor-
dinated efforts with other organizations. 
FroITl these propositions a structural explanation for the 
causes of interorganizational coordination is offered. NaITlely, the 
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organization's capacity to engage in inte rorganizational ac ti vitie swill 
be a function of its location vis-~-vis its major providers of resources. 
The serious probleITl of fragITlentation aITlong the hUITlan service de-
li very systeITl is due in part to those organizations in a vertically-
oriented structure, and their inability to interact with other organiz-
a tions in their locality. 
SUITlITla ry . To sUITlITlarize what has been stated thus far, the 
vertically-oriented organization illustrates certain distinguishing 
characteristics: They exist in a larger structure where the authority 
flows downward and where the ultiITlate source of authority rests on 
either the federal or state level. Finally, they are accountable to the 
parent organization (they have certain stipulations and/or ITlandates 
placed on theITl by the parent body as a condition for the receipt of 
funds.) FroITl these characteristics, certain behaviors can be antici-
pated in terITlS of the vertically-oriented organization's internal as 
well as external concerns and activities. The propositions as stated 
above exeITlplify, to a certain degree, these characteristics (pro-
positions 1-2) and the anticipated behavior (propositions 3 - 7). 
CHAPTER IV 
THE AREA AGENCY ON AGING: CASE MATERIAL 
The Area Agency on Aging, a program developed out of Title III 
of the Older Americans Act (1973), was chosen as an example of the 
vertically-oriented organization, and thus will be used as case 
material supporting the above mentioned propositions. The unique 
feature about this organization" aside from its vertical ties with the 
federal government, is that it was specifically designed to promote 
horizontal relations in the area from which it will operate. It is thus 
the latest federal attempt to devise a system which will insure the 
delivery of coordinated services to the elderly. Given the fact that 
this organization resembles a vertically-oriented organization, then 
one would expect that it would be more concerned with internal sur-
vival, and thus less likely to be involved in intense interorganizational 
activities. It is the assumption of this analysis, therefore, that this 
organization would be ineffecti ve in reac hing its stated goals whic h 
focus on the coordination of services for the elderly for the purpose 
of promoting independent functioning in their home environment. 
Based on the propositions as stated earlier, the following 
section will attempt to demonstrate the Area Agency on Aging's 
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resemblances to the vertically-oriented organization in terms of the 
direction and source of authority, the issue of accountability (who 
conrols the vast bulk of money and authority), and the anticipated 
behavior of the Area Agency on Aging. To help substantiate these 
propositions concerning the anticipated behavior of the Area Agency on 
Aging (AAA) a few select responses from a questionnaire given to 
approximately 77 organizations throughout Oregon will be used. This 
study (the Concord Study) was conducted in 1974 by staff members 
from the Institute on Aging, Portland State University, and involved 
an extensi ve interview with a staff person in organizations repre-
senting the following sectors: local government, local service 
agencies, senior groups, and other related organizations. The dis-
tricts covered in the survey included such counties as Washington, 
Columbia, Clackamas, Multnomah, Lane, Wasco, Sherman, Hood 
River, and Clark County. The main focus of the questionnaire 
centered on their perception of the Area Agency on Aging in terms of 
conflict and coordination in their particular network. The questions 
used for this description involved: 1) How they see the impact of the 
AAA on the local service community, and the elderly; 2) what they 
thought the AAA is supposed to do for old people, government bodies, 
and local service agencies, and how that compares with what they 
thought the AAA is actually doing to meet their goals and objec ti ve s; 
and 3) the extent to which the AAA has collaborated with other pro-
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grams in terms of joint activities. 
Gi ven this relatively limited amount of data, it is irnportant 
to note that the intent of using the AAA as case rnaterial in this 
context is not to ernpirically test these propositions Rer~. Rather 
this is a theoretical atternpt to describe the vertically-oriented 
organization with the hope that furture elaboration and refinernent will 
be made in this relatively untouched area. 
DIRECTION AND SOURCE OF AUTHORITY 
ProRosition 1. Where there are organizations founded by an 
indi vidual or a srnall group who appoint staff, 
and when staff creates comrnittees, di visions, 
and branches, the delegation of authority is 
directed downward. 
Robert Hudson (1974, pp. 43-44) in his description of the 
developmental steps which the area agencies are required to follow 
through illustrate s the ve rtical formation of the AAA. He state s that, 
In order to bring the area agencie s into 
existence the state agencies are charged with 
1) seeing that the state establishes planning 
service areas - which rnay or rnay not corre-
spond to other substate planning jurisdictions -
for purposes of aging planning, 2) deterrnining 
which of these areas should be designated high 
priority areas - that is, eligible for special 
funding for both planning and special services, 
3) deterrnine what type of agency or organization 
is to be designated as an area agency either pub-
lic, private, or non -profit, and 4) rnaking an 
initial planning grant to such an agency for pur-
poses of cornprehensi ve aging planning. 
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The staff of the new agency, in turn, are charged with the developITlent 
of comprehensive and coordinated programs. As is obvious from this 
description, the forITlation or the developITlent of the area agency 
follows along a vertical pattern - from the federal government to the 
state and on down to the area level. Moreover, because this develop-
ment does take on a vertical pattern, it is possible to see where the 
ultimate source of authority lies. The federal government has the 
final decision-making authority over these agencies. This final 
decision-making power relates to the issue of who controls the re-
sources and who makes the stipulations as to where and how this 
money and authority should be used. 
CONTROL OF RESOURCES 
(A c c ounta bility) 
Prop-osition 2. Where the authority runs downward from the 
federal or state to the local level, the ulti-
lllate control of resources and the decision-
making within the organization rests with 
national headquarters, i. e., they are "con-
ditionally autonomous. " 
To reiterate, the vast bulk of resources (money and legiti-
mation) flowing into the vertically-oriented organization are controlled 
by the parent body. This is particularly apparent in the A rea Agency 
on Aging where the vast bulk of their financial support and their 
legitimation is provided to them by the federal government for their 
support. Given the fact that organizational decision-makers are 
typically oriented to the adequate supply of resources and that this 
orientation determines, within fairly restrictive lim.its, the nature 
of interactions on the service delivery level and in the performance 
of mandated functions, then this has important implications for the 
functioning of the Area Agencies on Aging. 
96 
Compared with the older amendments (the 1965,1967, and 
1969 amendments), Title III which established the area agencies is 
more tightly integrated administratively and is designed to have 
greater congruence between goals and resources (Hudson, 1974). A 
two-part national goal was established which federal, state, and 
area agencies will be working toward and which specifically focuses 
on 1) keeping the older American in his horne environment, and 
2) removing any additional economic barriers so that the older Ameri-
can can be economically independent. The law specifies certain 
target populations - the poor and minority group older persons - to 
recei ve priority attention. Special planning grants will then be 
appropriated to those parts of the states designated as priority areas 
for the development of comprehensive and coordinated networks of 
service s (Hudson, 1974: p. 43). The area agency thus is charged 
with the function of eliminating gaps in service s to the elderly in a 
given community designated as a high priority area. It is given the 
money and authority to perform this function. Moreover, the ability 
of the area agency to undertake the linkage service task at the area 
level without the need of involving other organizations serves to 
establish their role as unique to them. Since organizations strive 
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to maintain their autonomy from others, then the linkage role which 
the federal legislation sets for the area agency enhance s the ability 
of the agency to demonstrate that it has an identifiable role for itself 
which is separate from the rest of the organizations in their particu-
lar network. This role affords them the legitimacy to function in 
this capacity. 
Recognizing that this may not be enough, that substantially 
increased funding alone is not sufficient to provide for the full-range 
of services to the elderly, the Area Agencies on Aging are also 
charged with the task of lIpooling" untapped re source s on behalf of 
the elderly. This function calls for a mobilizing or advocating role for 
the AAA to rnake sure that other service agencies are providing suffi-
cient services to the aging population. 
Taken together, area agencies were conceptualize~ as organ-
izations established explicitly to implement a national goal strategy 
through a series of developmental procedural steps. Funds and 
authority are appropriated to the area agencie s specifically to fill in 
service gaps, and to mobilize other resources which rnight be avail-
able in their more immediate setting. Consequently, area agencies 
becorne organizations established by superordinate actors on whose 
support they are totally dependent. Should the area agency wish to 
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break away froITl these constraints, it would be incUITlbent on theITl to 
develop support froITl other sources, only then would they be able to 
pursue activities not ITlandated by federal or state aging officials. 
Area Agencies on Aging are, thus, accountable to their 
parent organization - they are charged with certain stipulations on 
which they ITlust follow through as a condition for the receipt of funds. 
Although certain choices are left open to the area agency, the federal 
governITlent has spelled out, in a detailed fashion, the agency's 
functions. They have explicit instructions for allocating the funds 
which the federal legislation provides. Again, this issue has tre-
ITlendous iITlplications for the way in which these organizations inter-
act with other organizations. Because they put a great eITlphasis on 
being accountable to the federal governITlent, they will be less in-
clined to initiate, or for that ITlatter, participate in interorganizational 
acti vitie s. 
One of the restrictions placed on the area agency on the use 
of these funds is that it ITlust not provide services itself. Rather 
these agencie s lTIust plan for and ove rsee the iITlplelTIentation of 
services by other providers. The following is a list of the kind of 
se rvice s as specified by this legislation: 
State agencies ITlay award funds to include as part 
of the area plan, support for those service prograITls 
found necessary, to assist persons, to becoITle 
aware of the social services available in the area 
(inforlTIati on and refe rral and outreac h se rvice s), 
and support for other social services needed by 
older persons but which no public and private 
agencies can or will provide. (Federal Register, 
1973: p. 28050) 
The se re strictions place a specific emphasis on information 
about services which are available and the means of gaining access 
to them. Only when these are assured can funds be used for other 
purposes. As organizations which. are solely dependent upon one 
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source for its resources, they must be responsible to such demands. 
Beyond the service areas, remaining funds are to be used for 
planning, coordinating, and pooling -in untapped re source s. How thi s 
is to be done is left quite open. The central purpose of this non-
direct service emphasis is to bring greater resources into the non-
institutionalized older population. The anticipated consequence, 
moreover, of this draw-in or mobilizing function is that it will help 
to insure the continuation of programs until federal dollar s cease 
(Hudson, 1974). 
From this description, it becomes obvious that certain char-
acteristics of the Area Agency on Aging strongly reseITlble those 
characteristics of the vertically-oriented organization. More 
specifically, the vertical pattern in its forITlation, the dependency on 
the parent organization for the vast supply of resources and with it 
the regulations as a condition for the receipt of funds clearly demon-
strate the qualities of the AAA as it relates to the vertically-oriented 
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organization. Based on the propositions 3 - 7 as stated earlier, the 
anticipated behavior of the AAA will be illustrated in the forthcoming 
section. 
ANTICIPATING BEHAVIOR OF THE AREA AGENCY ON AGING 
Prop-osition 3. Because the vertically-oriented organization is 
dependent upon a parent body for virtually all 
its resources and is unable to reciprocate fully 
it ends up using compliance to the senior IS 
wishes. 
As mentioned above, the AAA has certain mandates and 
stipulations as to how and where the use of funds should be put, and 
what sort of activities should be performed. Given their relatively 
weak position in terms of their providers of resources .. they must 
comply to these mandates. Moreover .. because there are two quite 
distinct mandates, one calling for filling in service gaps, and the 
other for mobilizing resources, it is interesting to note the manner 
in which they internalize the demands which the federal government 
has placed on them. As will become evident in the forthcoming dis-
cussion, their compliance with both poses certain constraints on the 
organization and their ability to reach their stated goals. 
In terms of the linkage role the compliance to these guidelines 
is well suited to the agency's situation. Besides the explicit 
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instructions for the allocation of funds, the area agency is also sub-
ject to evaluation by the parent organization. Were it determined 
that the age ncy was not functioning according to expectations set out 
in the original guidelines, its existence would be threatened. Be-
cause the federal government controls the flow of funds and legitimacy 
(it provides the AAA their uniqueness as separate from other organiz-
ations) into the linkage portion of the guidelines, the anticipated be-
havior of the AAA will be to comply to the government's wishes. 
The draw-in role for the AAA (mobilizing resources) is 
marked by different characteristics. There are no dollars attached 
to this role as there are the linkage mandate, and as Hudson (1974) 
has pointed out, there is little reason for the area agencies to want 
to comply to this mandate in combination with the linkage role. As 
mentioned previously, there is an advantage to establishing the link-
age function independently of other organizations. For this to be 
combined with the draw-in role would negate their uniqueness pro-
vided to the AAA by their linkage function. Moreover, should the AAA 
choose to downplay the draw-in function, they would not leave them-
selves as open to criticism as would be the case if it chose to down-
play the linkage network function (Hudson, 1974: p. 50). 
Despite this reality, there still is a national mandate for this 
role on the AAA. Their inability to reciprocate to the dominant or 
parent body places them in a position of having to demonstrate that 
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they are willing to work at drawing in additional resources for the 
aging population (they end up complying to the senior 1 s wishes), but 
knowing at the same time that they run risks in doing so. This sets 
clear limits on the kinds of draw-in activities performed. Histories 
of social grant-in-aid programs indicate that the larger goals which 
cooperative efforts were designed to realize frequently fall short 
(Hudson, 1974). The underlying factor is the priority given to organ-
izational concerns (their internal survival as it relates to the con-
straints imposed on them by a central authority) as opposed to the 
a ttai nme nt of s uc h goals. 
Control of Dep'endency 
Prop'osition 4. Because the vertically- oriented organization is 
constrained by central authority, they will be 
less likely to control dependency through co-
operation strategies such as cooptation or 
coalition formation. 
As stated earlier, the AAA is constrained by central authority 
by the fact that the vast bulk of their funds and their legitimation is 
controlled by the federal government - they are totally dependent on 
that parent body. Should the agency choose to control this dependency 
through cooperation strategies, such as cooptation and coalition for-
mation, they run certain risks. To reiterate, these risks run from 
minor alterations in goals to cooptation by other organizations with 
whom it might be dealing. Moreover, these risks are proportional to 
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the disparity between the organization f s strength and that of its 
partner, and to the resources which it would contribute. Area 
Agencies are weak organizations in these terms since any joint under-
taking would involve too great a drain from their resources. Put 
another way, being that the AAA is a vertically-oriented organization 
concerned with their own internal survi val, and that their resources 
are central to establishing their organizational integrity, they would 
not willingly jeopardize them to entice another organization to join 
with them in pursuit of an external goal which can only serve some 
Ie s ser organizational purpose. The reality of the situation, howe ve r, 
is that the draw-in function for the AAA would result in entering into 
a cooperative venture with other agencies or public bodies where "all 
the parties concerned must agree upon an end or a goal toward which 
they are working," (Hudson, 1974: p. 50) making for an ambiguous 
situation. 
As Hudson has illustrated, organizations can minimize their 
involvement and vulnerability when taking part in cooperative ventures 
by limiting ventures (in the case of the AAA this would mean tapping 
marginal resources of their partners or other organizations), and 
defining the effort in procedural terms rather than goal terms, there-
by participating in a cooperative venture which is highly goal dis-
placed. This latter point is clearly demonstrated by the greater 
rationalization of the program. Great care is taken in linking 
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Title III appropriations and resources presumably available in the 
substate planning areas to program objecti ve s whic h will furthe r the 
overall legislative goal. By eliminating other behavioral determin-
ants, the lIa bstract-rational ll model around which this program. was 
designed, risks the ability to account for a wide variety of a~ti vity 
much of which takes place in the name of planning. Roland Warren 
state s the se lim.itations concisely: 
In the abstract-rational m.odel for planning, 
the substanti ve aspects are extraneous, rational 
calculation is confined to substanti ve aspects, 
tends to be organized in discreet units, and is 
final state oriented; the action system and the 
planning system do not coincide, and the tendency 
is toward monastic decision-making. 
(Warren (a), 1973: p. 59) 
In the course of adapting means to reach organizational goals, the 
means may becom.e ends in them.selves that displace the original 
goal thereby serving a useful purpose in minimizing the organizational 
vulnerability in a cooperative venture. 
Legitimization of Goals 
Prop-osition 5. Because the ve rticall y- oriented organization 
expends much energy on the legitimation of 
goals, they lack a concrete planning or action 
output - they become dominated by maintenance 
needs. 
Gi ven the fact that the vertically-oriented organization m.ust 
be accountable to that parent body who controls its resources, they 
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expend ITluch effort legitiITlizing their goals. Consequently, they run 
the risk of becoITling dOITlinated by their internal survival as opposed 
to focusing on change in their external environITlent. With this in 
ITlind, it is anticipated that as the AAA trie s to legitiITlize its linkage 
function as well as its draw-in role (one being ITluch less riskier to 
COITlply to) in the eyes of the federal governITlent, ITluch energy ITlay 
be expended which ITlay affect their ability to create any change in the 
environITlent. They ITlay not be able to work at iITlproving the overall 
econoITlic or physical conditions of the elderly. 
In terITlS of the study by the Institute on Aging (the Concord 
Study), the perception of the AAA by other organizations sheds SOITle 
light on this point. More specifically, their perceptions of the changes 
in the service cOITlITlunity (see Table II) and the conditions of the elderly 
(see Table III) which were the result of the AAA illustrate the possi-
bility that on the one hand the AAA made some changes in terITlS of 
filling in certain gaps in the cOITlITlunity, on the other hand, they made 
very little difference in terITlS of any overall change for the elderly, 
especially any econoITlic change (one of their stated goals). Put into 
the perspective of this analysis, this perception raises the possibility 
that the AAA ITlay be exerting a treITlendous amount of energy fulfilling 
its linkage task to satisfy its accountability to the federal government, 
yet in the process they ITlay be overlOOking the environmental issue at 
hand, naITlely the poor econoITlic situation for the elderly. 
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TABLE II 
ORGANIZATIONAL PERCEPTIONS CONCERNING THE IMPACT 
OF THE AREA AGENCY ON AGING ON 
THE SERVICE COMMUNITY 
Much Somewhat Somewhat Much 
Better Better No Worse Worse 
Off Off Different Off Off 
Filling of 
Gaps in the 
Local Service 30% 32% 15% 4% 9% 
Sector 
Developing 
Linkage 26% 36% 180/c 30/0 8% 
Services 
TABLE III 
ORGANIZATIONAL PERCEPTIONS CONCERNING THE IMPACT 
OF THE AREA AGENCY ON AGING ON 
THE SERVICE COMMUNITY 
Much Somewhat Somewhat Much 
Better Better No Worse Worse 
Off Off Different Off Off 
Income Finan- 7% 12% 66% 50/c 4% 
cial Condition 
Pre stige in the 11% 35% 35% 10% 7% Community 
A bility to affect 
Political Deci- 14% 30% 35% 5% 10% 
sions 
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Moreover, this study also illustrated some disastisfaction 
among these organizations which again rn.ay have some bearing on the 
above stated proposition. With the exception of planning for old 
people, there was no significance (statistically) in what these organ-
izations thought the AAA was supposed to do for old people, govern-
ment bodies, and local service agencies with what the AAA is actually 
doing in the area of planning, direct service and information (see 
Appendix A) 
Interactions 
Prop-osition 6. Because the vertically-oriented organization 
becomes dominated by internal concerns, they 
are less likely to become involved in intense 
interactions (i. e., joint activities) with other 
organizations in their functional geographic 
community. 
In view of the ad vantage s open to the A rea Agencie s on Aging 
in concentrating to a larger extent on funding a linkage deli very net-
work, and their vertical-orientation, they will not be as inclined to 
involve themselves heavily with other actors (involvement in terms of 
j oint programs) and even then it will be only to demonstrate their 
compliance with federal regulations. Efforts made in this area will 
tend to be incremental and goal displaced such as outlined above. 
Based on the continuum of interdependence as illustrated by 
Burton Gummer (1975), the relati vely low level of interdependence 
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that the AAA has with other organizations was illustrated by the 
responses (taken froITl the Concord Study as discussed above) to the 
following questions: 
1. In the past year how ITlany tiITles have you collaborated with 
the AAA on the forITlulation of prograITls? (See Table IV) 
2. In the past ITlonth how ITlany tiITles have you worked jointly on 
planning services to specific individuals? (See Table V) 
TABLE IV 
FREQUENCY OF COLLABORATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS 
TO THE AREA AGENCY ON AGING 
Frequency NUITlber Percent (%) 
None 8 14 
1-5 24 34 
6-20 11 15 
21-100 7 10 
More than 100 1 1 
Not Applicable 12 17 
Don't Know 2 3 
No InforITlation 6 8 
TABLE V 
FREQUENCY OF INTENSE:*CONTACTS OF ORGANIZATIONS 
TO THE AREA AGENCY ON AGING 
Frequency Number Percent (o/c) 
None 26 37 
1-5 10 14 
6-20 4 6 
21-100 4 6 
More than 100 2 3 
Not Applicable 15 21 
Don't Know 3 4 
No Information 7 10 
*Intense refers here as involvement with joint activities 
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As is evident from these results, 37% of those who responded 
to question 2 said, in effect, that they had no occasions to work 
jOintly with the AAA in the past month. This points out a strong 
possibility that the AAA has little to do with other organizations 
serving the elderly in terms of any intense collaboration. 
Coordination 
Prop-osition 7. Vertically-oriented organizations, because they 
are less likely to become involved in jOint pro-
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grams will less likely become involved in 
coordi nated efforts with othe r ·organizations. 
Based on the relationship between interdependence and co-
ordinated efforts as demonstrated by the previous studie s brought 
out in this theoretical discussion, one can speculate as to the ability 
of the AAA to become involved in coordinated efforts with other 
organizations. In other words, because the re is a close relationship 
with an organization's ability to be involved in joint programs and 
its ability to be involved in coordinated efforts with other organiz-
ations, then one can expect the AAA to be ineffective in reaching its 
stated goal, i. e., to coordinate services for the elderly. 
CHAPTER V 
IMPLICA TIONS 
Although it was not pos sible to empirically test the major 
assumption concerning the Area Agency on Aging's effectiveness at 
reaching its goals within the breadth of this analysis, the use of the 
AAA as case material in support of the contentions with regard to the 
vertically- oriented organization has implications in te rms of the 
"New Federalist's" strategy (i. e., the emphasis on the strengthening 
of horizontal relations through vertical means.) It points out a 
critical ambiguity in federal legislation. On the one hand, the arne nd-
lnents to the Older American Act calIon the area agencies to perform 
one role which is essentially administrative; overseeing the develop-
ment of gap-filling services. On the other hand, they are charged 
with a quite different task: mobilizing resources and making other 
planners and service providers more responsi ve to the needs of older 
persons. These two mandates, as is obvious, are quite incompatible. 
The federal government has asked the a.rea agencies to engage 
acti vely with other organizations in the area environment with the 
performance of the mobilizing function, when they have not been able 
to set the terms of their own existence in that environment because of 
thei r strong vertical ties. The detailed instructions regarding the 
development of the linkage network fosters reliance on the federal 
aging structure while m.obilizing resources requires that attention 
be concentrated at the area level. 
III 
While the original rationale for the area strategy was based 
on the need to develop support for aging services at the substate 
level, the way in which the Older American Amendments are being 
implemented will only serve to reinforce the vertical structure. This 
strategy has attem.pted to depart from. the traditional form.s of federal 
control, yet it has not departed from. the investment in the coordin-
ation process. Consequently, it is suggested in this analysis that 
this strategy will not be successful mainly because of its am.biguous 
nature - it has served to strengthen vertical ties in the com.munity 
through the elaboration of planning technology and the proliferation 
of federal rubric through coordination while at the sam.e time focusing 
on the maintenance of horizontal relations. 
As was dem.onstrated by this analysis, the vertical pattern 
can be seen as a deliberate rationally planned bureaucratic structure 
such as illustrated by the m.ulti-divisional decentralized structure 
among the m.ajor corporations as well as the developm.ent of the Area 
Agency on Aging. Whereas, the horizontal pattern in a com.m.unity is 
characterized by sentim.ents, inform.ality, lack of planning, and diffuse 
structures (Warren, 1963). Consequently, the norm.s, goals, and 
113 
behavior patterns between the vertical ties and those horizontal ties 
in a given community do not coincide. As Roland Warren (1963) has 
pointed out, vertical ties are generally stronger than horizontal 
ties among units of any community. Moreover, the historical analy-
sis of organizations (business, voluntary, and government-controlled 
relief-giving organizations) in this perspective illustrated the fact 
that vertical ties tend to strengthen as society becomes more com-
plex. The typical response, however, by the federal government to 
this strengthening of vertical ties and the proliferation of relief-
gi ving organizations was to try and strengthen horizontal relations 
by the creation of coordinating bodies which were rationally planned 
bureaucratic structures. As a result, because of their own survival 
in terms of those who control their resources, they will not be likely 
to focus on the horizontal relations in the community; they will tend 
toward more goal displacing behavior. 
Another implication with regard to this analysis has to do 
with inter-agency cooperation, and the ability of such an agency as 
the Area Agency on Aging to facilitate cooperation among agencies 
serving the aging population. As was demonstrated by this analysis, 
the independence of the vertically-oriented organization from the 
re st of the community and greater dependence on a system outside 
the community causes specific types of disagreements an10ng the 
local system. Moreover, because of the strong vertical ties of the 
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Area Agency on Aging, and thus the inability for this organization to 
get involved in any intense interaction with other organizations, it 
is predicted that it will not enter into a situation with other organiz-
ations where this conflict can be aired. A que stion can be raised, 
therefore, as to the Area Agency on Aging's ability to facilitate co-
operation when it is unable to enter into a cooperative situation be-
cause of its internal as well as its external structure. 
With this in mind, it is the hope of this analysis that future 
enquiry into this relatively untouched area will be made. More 
specifically, it is recommended that research be made which focuses 
on the New Federalist's strategy and its attempt to strengthen 
horizontal relations through vertical means. Using the variables 
dependency /interdependency and frequency of interactions, as was 
used in the context of this analysis, offers a theoretical base for 
such enquiry, and a point of departure for future developments in 
the area of the vertically-oriented organization. 
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B. 
APPENDIX 
Organizational re sponse s to perceived objecti ve s of 
AAA to do planning for old pe ople in relation to 
accomplishment of planning objectives by the AAA. 
Re sponse: The AAA is doing planning 
Response: The AAA is sup-
posed to do planning 
for old people 
Yes 
No 
No 
16 
18 
Chi Square = 4. 4625 
x
2 > 3.84* 
Yes 
25 
24 
Organizational responses to percei ved objective s of 
the AAA to do planning for local service agencies in 
relation to the accomplishment of planning objecti ves. 
Response: 
\ 
Response: The AAA is doing planning 
No Yes 
The AAA is sup- Yes 9 23 
posed to do planning 
for local service 
agenices 
No 13 
Chi Square = • 06063 
x
2 <. 3. 84** 
27 
;~Significant at . 05 level 
**N ot significant at . 05 level 
c. 
D. 
Organizational response to perceived objectives of 
the AAA to do planning for government bodie s in 
relation to the accomplishment of planning objectives 
by the AAA. 
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Response: The AAA is doing planning 
No Yes 
Response: The AAA is doing Yes 4 22 
planning for Govern-
ment bodie s. No 16 26 
Chi Square = 3.98950 
x
2 > 3. 84* 
Organizational responses to perceived objectives of 
the AAA to provide direct service for old people in 
relation to the accomplishment of direct service 
objectives by the AAA. 
Response: The AAA is supposed 
to provide direct 
services to old 
people 
*Significant at . 05 level 
Re sponse: The AAA is providing 
direct service 
No 
Yes 17 
No 30 
Chi Square = . 26669 
x
2 L 3. 84** 
Yes 
11 
15 
**N ot significant at . 05 level 
E. Organizational responses to perceived objectives of 
the AAA to provide direct services to local service 
agencies in relation to the accomplishment of direct 
service objectives by the AAA. 
121 
Response: The AAA is actually pro-
viding direct services 
F. 
Response: 
No 
The AAA is sup-
Yes 14 posed to provide 
direct service to No 34 
local se rvice 
agencies. 
Chi Square = • 57200 
x
2< 3. 84** 
Yes 
5 
19 
Organizational responses to percei ved objectives of 
the AAA to provide direct services to government 
bodies in relation to the acc omplishment of direct 
service objectives by the AAA. 
Response: The AAA is sup-
posed to provide 
direct services to 
government bodies 
Response: The AAA is providing 
direct service s 
No Yes 
Yes 5 3 
No 40 20 
Chi Square == • 05475 
x
2< 3.84** 
*Significant at . 05 level 
**Not significant at . 05 level 
G. 
H. 
Organizational responses to perceived objectives of 
the AAA to provide information to old people in 
relation to the accomplishment of information pro-
viding objectives by the AAA. 
Response: 
Response: The AAA is providing 
information 
No Yes 
The AAA is supposed 
Yes 13 14 
to provide infor-
mation to old 
people. 
No 24 
Chi Square = • 11032 
x
2 ( 3.84** 
22 
Organizational responses to perceived objectives of 
the AAA to provide information to local service 
agencies in relation to the accom.plishm.ent of 
inform.ation providing objectives by the AAA. 
Response: The AAA is providing 
services 
No Yes 
Response: The AAA is supposed 
Yes 13 21 to provide inform.-
ation to local service No 23 
agencies. 
*Significant at . 05 level 
**Not significant at .05 level 
Chi Square = 3.57 
x
2 <::;. 3. 84** 
15 
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